WHAT DO WORKERS WANT?
EMPLOYEE INTERESTS, PUBLIC INTERESTS, AND
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION UNDER THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT
CYNTHIA L. ESTLUNDt
INTRODUCTION

Consider the following scenario: Several employees engaged in
the construction of a nuclear facility detect improper construction
practices that they believe will render the plant fundamentally
unsafe and a threat to the surrounding community. Together the
employees raise these concerns with their employer and, when they
are ignored, with regulatory officials. As a result the employees are
fired. They file a charge against their employer under the National
Labor Relations.Act (NLRA),1 asserting their right, under section
7 of the Act, to engage in "concerted activities for the purpose of
...
mutual aid or protection." 2 The disposition of the employees'
charge is predictable: they are unlikely even to get a hearing. The
reason? The employees' concern was for the future safety of the
8
public, not for their own working conditions.
Had these private sector employees been fired for complaining
about the most trivial conditions of employment-say, the number
t Assistant Professor, University of Texas School of Law; B.A. 1978, Lawrence
University; J.D. 1983, Yale Law School. I would like to thank Jack Getman, Mike
Gottesman, Sam Issacharoff, Doug Laycock, David Rabban,John Robertson, Charles
Silver, Jordan Steiker, and Mark Yudof for their helpful comments on earlier drafts
of this Article, and Carmel Martin, GaryTruman, Denise Acebo, and Steve Phelps for
their able research assistance. I would also like to thank the Center for Labor
Relations Studies for its support.
1 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988).
2 Section 7 of the NLRA declares in pertinent part as follows: "Employees shall
have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in
other concerted activitiesfor the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aidor
protection .... " 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988) (emphasis added). Section 8(a)(1) of the
NLRA makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to "interfere with, restrain,
or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed" by § 7. 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(1) (1988). Discharging an employee for engaging in protected activity has
been held to constitute an unfair labor practice. See NLRB v. Washington Aluminum
Co., 370 U.S. 9, 12-14 (1962).
- I make this prediction with some confidence because the case is not entirely
hypothetical. See Daniel Int'l, 104 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1496 (1980) (advice memorandum
of NLRB General Counsel), described infra text accompanying notes 95-97.
(921)
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of portable toilets at the construction site-they would likely have
been entitled to reinstatement under the NLRA. But the safety of
the public, which these employees believed to be imperiled by the
work they were doing for their employer, is not deemed a proper
concern of employees under the Act; it does not come within the
realm of "mutual aid or protection."
This seeming anomaly-the privileging of material self-interest
over moral responsibility under section 7-is all the more striking to
those familiar with the law governing the speech rights of public
employees. Had they been receiving their paychecks from the
government, these workers would have had a strong claim under the
First Amendment to protection against reprisals of this sort; their
speech would have been recognized as involving matters of grave
public concern, and thus as standing at the core of freedom of
speech.4 For private sector employees, however, the controlling
section 7 doctrine leads to opposite conclusions. What conception
of work and of workers underlies this restriction on employee
rights? Can it be one that comports with the language and policies
of the NLRA?
Section 7 of the NLRA, enacted in 1935, gives to most private
sector employees the right to engage in "concerted activities for the
purpose of ... mutual aid or protection." 5 Central among the
activities covered by section 7 are union organizing and strikes to
improve working conditions, but section 7 also protects employee
protest and advocacy unrelated to traditional union activity. 6 As
such it affords to private sector employees some of the same
protections that the First Amendment was later construed to confer
on public employees. 7 Together these two large bodies of federal
4 See infra text accompanying notes 42-53.
5 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988); see supra note 2.
6 See generally Charles J. Morris, NLRB Protection in the Nonunion Workplace: A
Glimpse at a General Theory of Section 7 Conduct, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1673 (1989)
(putting forward a general formula for distinguishing conduct the NLRB must protect
under this language from that it which it may, but need not, protect).
7 See, e.g., Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987) (holding that a public
employee may not be discharged for statements made in connection with a matter of
public concern); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (same); Pickeringv. Board of
Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (same). For a sampling of recent commentary on the
public employee speech doctrine, see Matthew W. Finkin, IntramuralSpeech, Academic
Freedom, and the FirstAmendment, 66 TEx. L. REv. 1323 (1988); Richard M. Fischl,
Labor, Managemen and the First Amendment: Whose Rights Are These, Anyway?, 10
CARDOzO L. REV. 729 (1989); Risa L. Lieberwitz, Freedom of Speech in Public Sector
Employment: The Deconstituiionalizationof the Public Sector Workplace, 19 U.C. DAvis
L. REv. 597 (1986); Toni M. Massaro, Significant Silences: Freedom of Speech in the
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law-section 7 of the NLRA and the public employee speech
doctrine under the First Amendment-extend to most of this
country's employees rights to discuss and protest matters of concern
to them free from retaliation by their employers. 8 Both require
employers to tolerate employee speech that they will often find
objectionable. And although the two doctrines are mutually
exclusive in the scope of their coverage, 9 the kinship between them
is undeniable."
Indeed, there has been a seemingly inevitable
Public Sector Workplace, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1987).

8 These doctrines are not the sole source of protection for employee protesters.
Thus, some public sector "whistleblowers" enjoy protection by federal statute. See
Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (codified in
scattered sections of 5 U.S.C. and 22 U.S.C.); Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub.
L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.
and numerous other titles). Under the latter statute, federal employees also have the
right to engage in certain forms of concerted activity, including collective bargaining,
but not the right to strike. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7135 (1988). Many state and local
employees enjoy comparable rights under public employee bargaining statutes that
are generally modelled on the NLRA (except that most deny or limit the right to

strike).

See HARRY T. EDWARDS ET AL., LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN THE PUBLIC

SECTOR. CASES AND MATERIALS 153-54 (3d ed. 1985). In addition, civil service laws,
which generally require some cause for discharge and provide for hearings on the
issue, offer some protection to public employees against retaliatory discharge. Finally,
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments protects many
public employees against arbitrary discharge. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541-43 (1985).
Similarly, § 7 is not the sole source of protection for private sector employee
protesters. Most states have recognized, at least in some (limited) circumstances, a
"public policy exception" to the presumption that employment is "at will." This
exception makes discharge actionable where it is deemed to violate public policy, as
where an employee is discharged for exposing or refusing to engage in unlawful
conduct. Such actions are supplemented by an increasing number of state
"whistleblower" statutes. See MATrHEW W. FINKIN ET AL., LEGAL PROTECTION FOR
THE INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYEE 284-86 (1989); Massaro, supra note 7, at 17-20. Still, as a
practical matter, state remedies for wrongful discharge are less than readily available.
See PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE:

THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND

EMPLOYMENT LAW 81-82 (1990); Clyde W. Summers, Individual Protection Against
UnjustDismissal: Timefor a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481,487-88 (1976); Note, Protecting
Employees at Will Against Wrongul Discharge: The PublicPolicy Exception, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 1931, 1937-42 (1983); see also infra text accompanying notes 251-59.
9 The vast majority of private sector employees in this country, though not
protected by the First Amendment, are covered by the NLRA and its strictures against
retaliatory discharge; the chief exclusions are those for agricultural employees and
employees covered by the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1988). See 29
U.S.C. § 152(2)-(3) (1988) (defining "employer" and "employee" for purposes of the
NLRA). Public employees, by contrast, while protected by the First Amendment, are
excluded from the NLRA's coverage. Id.
10 Some commentators have applauded the influence of public employee speech
principles on § 7 rights. See Staughton Lynd, Employee Speech in the Privateand Public
Workplace: Two Doctrines or One?, 1 INDUS. REL. L.J. 711 (1977); cf. Clyde W.
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11
convergence between the two with respect to a variety of issues.
But as to the crucial issue of subject matter-the topics on which
employee expression is protected-these two bodies of law have
developed in strikingly different directions.1 2 Section 7 has been
interpreted to protect only empioyee speech relating to terms and
conditions of employment,1 3 while the First Amendment now
protects public employees only when they speak on "matters of
public concern."14 To a great extent, then, the kinds of protests
that in the private sector are covered by section 7-those concerning
the terms and conditions of employment-are unprotected by the
First Amendment in the public sector. Conversely, the protests
covered by the First Amendment-those on "matters of public
15
concern"-lie beyond the scope of section 7 in the private sector.
This largely unexplored aspect of section 7 doctrine is the
subject of Part I of this Article. In Part I, I launch my critique of
the subject-matter limits of section 7 of the NLRA. Section 7 is
meant to protect employees who act together to advance the

Summers, The Privatization of PersonalFreedoms and Enrichment of Democracy: Some
Lessons From Labor Law, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 689, 697 (noting that with the Wagner
Act, "Congress brought the First Amendment to private employment"). At least one
scholar, however, is not so sanguine about the desirability of this kinship. See
Lieberwitz, supra note 7. Lieberwitz decries the increasing deference to hierarchical
modes of workplace management, long pervasive in the interpretation of the NLRA,
in the doctrine of public employee speech. Id. at 638-66.
11 See Lynd, supra note 10, at 754 (describing the convergence between the two
doctrines as "remarkable"). For example, in Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ.
v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977), the Court held that a discharge of a public employee
violates the First Amendment where it is partly motivated by the employee's having
engaged in protected speech, unless the employer can prove that it would have fired
the individual even absent the speech. In Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1980),
enforced, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982), the National
Labor Relations Board adopted a very similar test, modelled on Mt. Healthy, for proof
ofunlawful discrimination under § 8(a)(3) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1988).
The Board's Wright Line test was upheld by the Supreme Court in NLRB v.
Transportation Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983).
12 Professor Richard Michael Fischl noted but did not focus on this difference in
his recent commentary. See Fischl, supra note 7, at 740; see also ARCHIBALD COX ET
AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAw 545-46 (1991) (noting the same contrast).

Lynd notes in passing that § 7, unlike the First Amendment, protected only speech
"connected with a labor dispute." Lynd, supra note 10, at 712 n.3. The significance
of that limitation, and its contrast with First Amendment doctrine, was not fully
apparent until the Court's decision in Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983), which
all but banished public-employee speech arising out of ajob-related dispute from the
First Amendment. See infra text accompanying notes 42-53.
13 See infra text accompanying notes 20-41.
14 See infra text accompanying notes 42-55.
15 See infra text accompanying notes 56-97.
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interests they share with their co-workers.
The notion that
employees' shared interests extend only to their wages and working
conditions is compelled neither by the language nor by the intent
of section 7, and should be rejected. It is based on a partial and
increasingly outdated vision of the meaning of work in this society.
Abundant evidence demonstrates the existence of profound
employee concern over such matters as the safety and quality of the
product or service they provide. Such concerns emerge from and
affect the work experience and well-being of employees just as do
concerns about wages and material working conditions. 16 Employee interests in safety and quality are shared, of course, by consumers
and the public, but this should only strengthen their claim to
protection under section 7, for private employee speech on matters
of concern to the public, much like public employee speech on such
matters, provides valuable information that enriches public
discourse. This public interest underscores the need to recognize
17
a broader range of employee concerns under the Act.
In Part III, I advance an alternative interpretation of "mutual aid
or protection" under section 7 and explore its probable ramifications. I make this proposal less with an eye to its adoption than to
sharpen the focus of my criticism of the prevailing conception of
employee interests under section 7. I argue that where employees
manifest their shared concern over a given issue by engaging in
"concerted activity," this fact is a truer guide to the interests of
employees than is an arbitrary delimitation like the one imposed by
current section 7 doctrine. From this perspective it is clear that
employees have a legitimate interest not only in the terms and
conditions of their employment, but in the effect their employer's
product or conduct has on customers, consumers, patients, clients,
and the public at large. The scope of employee "mutual aid or
protection" under section 7 thus should be expanded to accommodate the real range of employee concerns. This proposal might
seem to portend a dramatic escalation in the workplace protest that
employers must tolerate. But its probable consequences turn out,
on closer examination, to be more modest, for they are limited by
various restrictions on employee rights under section 7, both in the
18
law and in the realities of the workplace.
16 See infra text accompanying notes 123-65.
17 See infra text accompanying notes 166-89.
18 See infra text accompanying notes 214-33.
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The more serious obstacles to my proposal lie deeply embedded
in the employment relationship; it is to these difficulties that I turn
in Part IV. The narrow reading of section 7 under current law
reflects not just a crimped view of the interests of employees and
the public, but also an expansive solicitude for the competing
interests of employers-in particular, the employer's interest in the
loyalty of its employees, and, more broadly, in managerial prerogatives that are thought to be threatened by employee meddling in
matters apart from the immediate employment relationship.
Solicitude for these employer "rights" is all-too-well established at
present, but I argue that they have a tenuous standing under the
NLRA in light of the plain intention of Congress to limit those
rights dramatically with the passage of the Wagner Act in 1935.
Ultimately, they do not provide particularly compelling grounds for
preferring one interpretation of section 7 to another, and should
give way to the interests of employees in speaking out on matters of
concern to them at the workplace, and to the public interest in
broader disclosure of information about the operations of important
19
economic actors.
Current section 7 doctrine designates for employees a limited
sphere in which economic self-interest reigns.
It reflects an
impoverished understanding of the meaning of work in our lives
and penalizes those who develop and express genuine concerns
about the many ways in which the enterprises for which they work
affect the communities in which they live. The expansive vision
embodied in section 7 calls for a more generous conception of
employee interests and employee rights.
I. THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS: CONTRASTING PROTECTIONS
UNDER SECTION 7 AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

The contours of section 7 doctrine appear in sharp relief when
juxtaposed against the protections 'the First Amendment affords
public employee protest and advocacy. Both doctrines implicitly
posit a spectrum running from purely self-interested, work-related
concerns to purely political expression. Both draw a line at much
the same point along that spectrum, distinguishing between speech
of concern to third parties and the general public and speech on
traditional workplace grievances. But this distinction has diametrically opposite implications for the two groups of employees: a

19 See infra text accompanying notes 260-302.
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work-related grievance is the key to protection under section 7; it
may sound the death knell of the public employee's claim under the
First Amendment.
A. A First Look: Eastex, Jefferson Standard
and Connick v. Myers
The "mutual aid or protection" clause of section 7 extends the
scope of protected advocacy beyond that which pertains to actual
"terms and conditions of employment," 20 but not by much. This
is evidenced by the Supreme Court's decision in Eastex, Inc. v.
NLRB. 21 In Eastex the Court held that section 7 protected
employees' distribution of leaflets discussing the presidential veto
of an increase in the federal minimum wage and commenting on a
proposed state constitutional amendment enshrining the "right-towork" principle.?2 The newsletter exhorted members to "defeat
our enemies and elect our friends." 2 3 The Court framed the issue
as whether the concerted activity bore a sufficiently "immediate
relationship to employees' interests as employees" to pass muster
under section 7,24 or whether the "relationship [was] so attenuated
that [the] activity cannot fairly be deemed to come within the
'mutual aid or protection' clause." 25
newsletThe Court concluded that the matters discussed in the
ter bore on the employees' terms and conditions of employment
significantly enough to uphold the Board's decision in their favor.
The proposed constitutionalization of the existing statutory "right
to work" provision, the Court suggested, "could affect employees
adversely 'by weakening Unions and improving the edge business
20 That phrase is used elsewhere in the Act to designate those subjects regarding
which an employer is statutorily required to bargain with the designated representative of its employees. See NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988). The broader
scope of § 7 is treated in Julius G. Getman, The Protection of Economic Pressure by
Section 7 of The NationalLaborRelationsAct, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 1195, 1218-22 (1967).
21 437 U.S. 556 (1978). The Eastex decision is the subject of insightful analyses by

Professors Richard Michael Fischl and Alan Hyde. See Richard M. Fischl, Self, Others,
and Section 7: Mutualism and Protected Protest Activities Under the National Labor
Relations Act, 89 COLuM. L. REV. 789,796-800 (1989); Alan Hyde, Economic LaborLaw
v. Political Labor Relations: Dilemmas for Liberal Legalism 60 TEX. L. REV. 1, 7-11
(1981).
22 Eastex, 437 U.S. at 569-70.
23 Id. at 559-60.
24 Id. at 567.
25 Id. at 568.
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has at the bargaining table.'" 26 The minimum wage issue was
more problematic for the Court, for on its face the newsletter
merely appealed to the employees' solidarity with lower-paid
workers, which, standing alone, would probably not have qualified
for section 7 protection. 27 But the Court agreed with the Board
that the employees, in distributing the newsletter, were likely
motivated by "the widely recognized impact that a rise in the
minimum wage may have on the level of negotiated wages generally"; moreover, "'concern by [these] employees for the plight, of other
employees might gain support for them at some future time when
' 28
they might have a dispute with their employer. "'
What had appeared to be a solidaristic appeal on behalf of the
principles of the labor movement was transformed in Eastex into a
calculated appeal to the pocketbook-and in this guise was protected. 29 Eastex demonstrates that some speech on matters beyond the
actual terms and conditions of employment-even matters over
which the employer has no direct control-may gain section 7
protection, but only if it can be linked to a traditional self-interested
economic objective. In the absence of such an objective, section 7
does not protect even employee protests aimed at the practices of
their own employer.
Consider NLRB v. Local Union 1229, IBEW,5 ° the Jefferson
Standardcase. There the Supreme Court held that section 7 did not
protect a group of broadcast technicians fired for distributing
leaflets critical of the quality of television service their employer
provided to the public. 31 Their leaflet read in part:
IS CHARLOTTE A SECOND-CLASS CITY?

You might think so from the kind of Television programs
being presented by the Jefferson Standard Broadcasting Co. over
WBTV ....
Did you know that all the programs presented over
WBTV are on film and may be from one day to five years old.
There are no local programs presented by WBTV. You cannot
receive the local baseball games, football games or other local
events because WBTV does not have the proper equipment to
make these pickups.... Why doesn't the Jefferson Standard
26 Id. at 569 (quoting the newsletter at issue).
27 See id.
28 Id. at 569-70 (quoting Eastex, Inc., 215 N.L.R.B. 271, 274 (1974) (quoting
General Elec. Co., 169 N.L.R.B. 1101, 1103 (1968))).
29 See Fischl, supra note 21, at 796-98.
30 346 U.S. 464 (1953).
31 See id. at 477.

1992]

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION UNDER THE NLRA

Broadcasting Company purchase the needed equipment to bring
you the same type of programs enjoyed by other leading American
cities? Could it be that they consider Charlotte a second-class
community and only entitled to the pictures now being presented
to them?
32

WBT TECHNICIANS

The Court characterized the leaflets, which apparently contained no
factual misrepresentations, 33 as a "sharp, public, disparaging attack
upon the quality of the company's product and its business
policies," 34 and held that the employees had engaged in "such
3 5
detrimental disloyalty" as to lose section 7 protection.
Notwithstanding the Court's harsh characterization, it is clear
that neither the tone of the leaflet nor the directness with which it
targeted the employer accounts for the holding in the case. "Sharp,
public, disparaging attack[s]" on an employer are hardly uncommon
in labor disputes; yet they are protected by section 7.36 Nor does
the result follow from the fact, found by the Board and credited by
the Court, that the true purpose of the radio technicians' attack on
their employer's product, undisclosed in the leaflets, was to gain an
advantage in ongoing collective bargaining negotiations. 3 7 On the
contrary, this traditional economic purpose might have put the
employees on stronger ground had they disclosed it in their
leaflets.3 8 In fact, the Court left no doubt that the employees' case
32

Id. at 468.

See id. at 472.
Id. at 471.
Id. at 472.
36 See e.g., Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 60-61
(1966) (statements that may "defame one of the parties to the dispute" are protected);
NLRB v. Container Corp. of America, 649 F.2d 1213, 1214-15 (6th Cir. 1981)
(implication that manager was a slave driver and treated employees like a "chain
gang" protected); Great Lakes Steel v. NLRB, 625 F.2d 131, 132 (6th Cir. 1980)
(accusation that employer had engaged in "murder for profit" protected); New York
Univ. Medical Ctr., 261 N.L.R.B. 822 (1982) (accusation that employer's guards used
"fascist gestapo" tactics protected). See generally Getman, supra note 20, at 1239
(recognizing that "bitter and intense" attacks against the employer for his labor
policies are permitted under the Act); John B. Lewis et al., Defamation and the
Workplace: A Survey of the Law and Proposalsfor Reform, 54 Mo. L. REV. 797, 837-42
(1989)
(describing treatment of defamation in labor disputes).
37 See Jefferson Standard,346 U.S. at 476-77.
38 The Court emphasized the employees' failure to disclose their involvement in
a labor dispute, id. at 476-77, and, following the Board, reserved judgment on
"'whether the disparagement of product involved here would have justified the
employer in discharging the employees responsible for it, had it been uttered in the
context of a conventional appeal for support of the union in the labor dispute.'" Id.
"
-4
35
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would have been further weakened by the lack of an underlying
economic purpose-that is, had they been motivated solely by a
sincere concern for the quality of the product they helped put out:
Assuming that there had been no pending labor controversy, the
conduct of the [employees] ... unquestionably would have
provided adequate cause for their disciplinary discharge ....
Their attack related itself to no labor practice of the company. It

made no reference to wages, hours or working conditions. The
policies attacked were those of finance and public relationsfor which
managemen not technicians, must be responsible.3 9
Jefferson Standard thus rests squarely on a limited view of the
legitimate interests of employees: concerted public criticism of the
product or service provided by an employer does not itself advance
the "mutual aid or protection" of workers; it is simply too remote
from the employees' legitimate concerns regarding the terms and
conditions of their own employment to be entitled to section 7
protection.
This view of Jefferson Standard supplements the conventional
reading of the decision as condemning the tactical use of "product
disparagement" to achieve traditional collective bargaining objectives: activity of this kind, while it is literally "concerted activity for
mutual aid or protection" and is not illegal, is nonetheless unprotected because it is held to be an "indefensible" and "disloyal"
tactic. 40 Jefferson Standard is thus read, entirely correctly, as an
"outside" limitation on activity that is literally within the terms of
section 7. But it is clear that the decision necessarily rests as well
on an "internal" limitation on the meaning of section 7: concerns
about the product (or other aspects of the employer's policies not
directly relating to terms and conditions of employment) are not
themselves the proper subject of concerted activity by employees

at 477 (quoting Jefferson Standard Broadcasting Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 507, 1512 n.18
(1951)). Subsequent cases have tended to find criticism of the employer's product
protected if it is not excessively disparaging in tone and is made in the context of an
attempt to improve working conditions. See infra text accompanying notes 68-81.
39
346 U.S. at 476 (emphasis added).
40
See, e.g.,JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAw

84-85 (1983); Cox ET AL., supranote 12, at 546-50 (providing numerous examples of
unprotected concerted activities).
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because they are irrelevant to the goal of "mutual aid or protec41
tion."
The First Amendment analysis of this case, under modern public
employee speech doctrine, would have been quite different. Had
the Jefferson Standard technicians been employed by a government
agency, and fired for publicly criticizing the quality of the agency's
services, they very likely would have been entitled to reinstatement.
Under the Supreme Court's decision in Connick v. Myers,4 2 their
protest would most likely have been deemed speech on a "matter of
public concern," and thus protected against employer retaliation,
precisely because it was unrelated to the terms and conditions of the
43
protesters' own employment.
Connick v. Myers illustrates the application of the public
employee speech doctrine. Sheila Myers, an assistant district
attorney in New Orleans, was informed in 1980 that she was to be
transferred to a different section of the criminal court. She
objected and raised with a supervisor a "number of other office
matters" relating to morale and fairness in the office. 44 When her
supervisor claimed that her concerns were not shared by her coworkers, Myers prepared and distributed a questionnaire "soliciting
the views of her fellow staff members concerning office transfer
policy, office morale, the need for a grievance committee, the level
of confidence in supervisors, and whether employees felt pressured
to worl in political campaigns." 45 Fearing that Myers was "creat41 See ATLESON, supra note 40, at 85 ("It is also surprising, but perhaps revealing,
that the Board would feel that quality of equipment and programming would be
irrelevant to the station's technicians.").
42 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
43 As I will show, some courts might withdraw First Amendment protection if the
evidence showed an underlying purpose of advancing economic self-interest, whether
disclosed or not. See infra text accompanying notes 57-66. At least absent such a
purpose, however, the criticism would quite certainly be deemed a "matter of public
concern." See, e.g., Greenberg v. Kmetko, 811 F.2d 1057, 1060 (7th Cir. 1987)
(holding that a social worker's criticism of his agency's handling of cases was speech
on a matter of public concern), affd in relevantpart, 840 F.2d 467,474 (7th Cir. 1988)
(en banc); Czurlanis v. Albanese, 721 F.2d 98, 104 (3d Cir. 1983) (finding that public
allegations of inefficiency, falsification of reports, and performance of unnecessary
repairs involved matters of public concern, in part because the employee did not air
any grievances regarding his own working conditions). For a survey of lower court
decisions applying Connick, see Stephen Allred, From Connick to Confusion: The
Struggle to Define Speech on Matters of Public Concern, 64 IND. L.J. 43, 55-68 (1988).
4 See Connick, 461 U.S. at 140-41.
45 Id.
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ing a 'mini-insurrection' within the office," the district attorney
46
discharged her.
In upholding her discharge against a First Amendment challenge, the Supreme Court held that, with the sole exception of the
question relating to work in political campaigns, the questionnaire
did not raise "matters of public concern." 47 According to the
Court, "Myers did not seek to inform the public that the District
Attorney's Office was not discharging its governmental responsibilities in the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases. Nor did
Myers seek to bring to light actual or potential wrongdoing or
breach of public trust .... "48 Apart from the one question
regarding political pressures, then, her questions were mere
extensions of Myers's dispute over her transfer and not worthy of
protection under the First Amendment. 49 There is no doubt that
the entirety of Myers's questionnaire was within the general ambit
of freedom of expression; that is, it was not within "one of the
narrow and well-defined classes of expression" such as obscenity
that is excluded from the First Amendment altogether.50
But
Connich held that a public employee's discharge is subject to First
Amendment scrutiny only when she speaks on a "matter of public
concern." 5 1 In the majority's view, most of Myers's speech failed
to meet this new threshold test.
Ironically, a public employee discharged for distributin4 leaflets
like those at issue in Jefferson Standard would have little difficulty
surmounting the hurdle posed by the public concern test in
Connick.5 2 But to sharpen the irony, it is also the case that, had
Sheila Myers been a private employee covered by the NLRA, her
effort to ascertain whether her fellow employees shared her
Id.
47 Id. at 147-49.
46

48 Id. at 148.

'9 Id. Regarding the question relating to pressure to work on campaigns, the
Court held that Myers' interest in speaking freely on this matter of "limited" public
concern was outweighed by the government interest in "effective and efficient
fulfillment of its responsibilities," id. at 150, despite the absence of evidence that her
actions disrupted operations or affected her performance in any way. See id. at 151,
154.
5o Id. at 147.
51 Id. at 146. For my critique of the "public concern" test announced in Connick
(and since incorporated into the First Amendment law governing defamation actions),
see Cynthia L. Estlund, Speech on Matters of Public Concern: The Perils of an Emerging
First Amendment Categoy, 59 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1 (1990).
52 See supra text accompanying notes 30-41.

1992]

FREEDOM OFEXPRESSION UNDER THE NLRA

concerns about morale, the lack of a grievance procedure, and the
fairness of the transfer arrangements would almost certainly have
been protected by section 7 of the Act, 53 entitling her in all
likelihood to reinstatement and back pay. Her objective would
certainly have been for "mutual aid or protection," 54 and her
conduct would very likely have met the definition of "concerted
activity. "55 Myers's speech would have fallen within the realm of
statutorily protected workplace protest under section 7 precisely
because it was grounded in ordinary workplace concerns.
B. A Closer Look at the Contrast
"Speech on matters of public concern" and "speech on terms
and conditions of employment" are not, of course, mutually
exclusive categories. A good deal of employee speech is, to some
degree, both.5 6 - What bears emphasis is that in determining
whether such speech is eligible for protection, the two elements
have precisely opposite consequences under section 7 doctrine and
First Amendment doctrine respectively.
This point was evident in Connick itself. On the one hand, the
Court acknowledged that Sheila Myers's questionnaire dealt with
issues of potential concern to the public, inasmuch as "discipline
and morale in the workplace are related to an agency's efficient
performance of its duties." 57 Yet the Court went on to conclude
that "the focus of Myers' questions is not to evaluate the performance of the office but rather to gather ammunition for another
round of controversy with her superiors. These questions reflect
53 She would not have been protected if she was acting in violation of a valid nosolicitation rule limiting such activity to nonwork time in nonworking areas. See
Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 803 n.10 (1945).
4The subject matter of Myers' questionnaire is clearly pertinent to terms and
conditions of employment, and thus within the legitimate realm of employee protest

under § 7.

5 Generally speaking, a single employee's attempt to solicit the involvement of
fellow employees on employment-related grievances is protected under § 7. See
NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 831 (1984); infra notes 197-198
and accompanying text. Certainly Myers' supervisors saw her actions as directed
toward group action: they fired her for attempting to "creat[e] a 'mini-insurrection.'"

Connick, 461 U.S. at 141.
56 SeeJames G.Pope, Labor-Community Coalitionsand Boycotts: The Old LaborLaw,
the New Unionism, and the Living Constitution, 69 TEx. L. REv. 889, 902-04 (1991)
(noting the coincidence of traditional labor and community objectives in many
coalition campaigns).
57 Connick, 461 U.S. at 148.
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one employee's dissatisfaction with a transfer and an attempt to
turn that displeasure into a cause c~l~bre."58 The presence of a
selfish motive behind Myers's questionnaire thus tainted the
message it communicated and doomed her First Amendment
claim.

59

The lower courts have seized upon this device as a way to clear
many public employee speech cases from their dockets. 60 The
courts have permitted the silencing of public employee complaints
about educational quality, 61 corporal punishment of children in
their care, 62 treatment of patients in public institutions, 63 and
use of public funds, 64 in each case finding that the complaints
were rooted in personal work-related grievances. The presence of
such a grievance does not automatically result in a loss of protection
65
where matters otherwise of concern to the public are at issue.
There is no doubt, however, that the presence of a self-interested,
employment-related grievance now poses a significant problem for
58 Id.

59 See id.
60 The amenability of the public concern requirement-which the Court in Connick

characterized as an issue of law, not of fact, see Connick, 461 U.S. at 148 n.7-to
summaryjudgment procedures may have been among its chief attractions to a Court
majority seeking to free public employers from the threat of protracted litigation over
many public employee speech cases. See Estlund, supra note 51, at 53 n.287.
61 See e.g., Landrum v. Eastern Ky. Univ., 578 F. Supp. 241,246-47 (E.D. Ky. 1984)
(finding that a professor's criticism of the school administration on matters of
academic policy was properly characterized as a personal dispute); Ballard v. Blount,
581 F. Supp. 160, 163-64 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (holding that a faculty member's complaints
about his salary, the assignment of freshman English courses, and the content and
procedures used in reviewing his course syllabus did not touch on matters of public
concern), aff'd, 734 F.2d 1480 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1086 (1984); Mahaffey
v. Kansas Bd. of Regents, 562 F. Supp. 887, 890 (D. Kan. 1983) (characterizing the
points of departmental policy criticized by a faculty member as "quintessentially" of
personal rather than public concern).
62 See Moore v. Mississippi Valley St. Univ., 871 F.2d 545, 551 (5th Cir. 1989)
(holding that day care center employees' complaints about corporal punishment of
children "perhaps ris[e] above th[e] purely personal level," but are not of public
concern because they are motivated by the "personal grievance[s] of the employees").
63 See Smith v. Cleburne County Hosp., 870 F.2d 1375, 1382 (8th Cir. 1989)
(explaining that plaintiff's criticism of the quality of patient care and the incompetence of hospital administrators was left unprotected when it took the form of
"caustic personal attacks").
64 See Berg v. Hunter, 854 F.2d 238, 242 (7th Cir. 1988) (noting that "[a]lthough
matters of sexual harassment [and] the misappropriation ofcollege property... may
relate to [the college's] efficient performance," plaintiff's charges did not raise
"broader issues of public school administration unrelated to his personal disputes").
65 See generally Allred, supra note 43, at 44 (reviewing cases).
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the public-employee protester seeking protection against retaliation
66
under the First Amendment.
And yet the same link between protest and the terms and
conditions of one's own employment, so damning to the public
employee under Connick, is an indispensable prerequisite to the
private employee's claim to section 7 protection. 67 Indeed, if the
link is sufficiently apparent, a good deal of comment on "matters of
public concern" can be brought under the aegis of section 7.68
This means that organized, well-advised groups of employees can
gain protection for what may seem to be straightforward "product
disparagement," notwithstanding Jefferson Standard.6 9
Thus,
aircraft mechanics who publicly questioned the safety of airline
maintenance procedures, 70 ambulance drivers who criticized the
safety of their vehicles and their own readiness, 71 nurses who
72
complained about the level of medical care in a medical facility,
and reporters who expressed dissatisfaction with the quality of their
newspaper 8 have all managed to find protection under section 7.
In each case the employees were able to avoid the strictures of
Jefferson Standardsimply by making it clear that their criticisms arose
74
out of ongoing labor disputes of a traditional sort.
66

See generally Estlund, supra note 51, at 36-38 (explaining that, under Connick,

otherwise protected speech may be "demoted" if it arises in the context of a
workplace grievance).
61 Cf Fischl, supra note 21.
Professor Fischl's focus in his very illuminating
article-employee activity in support of other workers in connection with the terms
of the latter's employment-is different from mine. Nonetheless, my thinking profited
greatly from his chronicle and critique of the judicial search for self-interest in
apparently solidaristic activities.
61 Much of the activity described by Pope, supra note 56, is of the sort that could
run afoul of limitations on § 7 protection but that could also, and often does,
emphasize the effect of the criticized practices on employees.
69 See infra text accompanying notes 125-51.
70 See Allied Aviation Serv. Co., 248 N.L.R.B. 229, enforced, 636 F.2d 1210 (3d Cir.
1980).
71
72

See SAS Ambulance Serv., Inc., 255 N.L.R.B. 286 (1981).
See NLRB v. Mount -Desert Island Hosp., 695 F.2d 634 (1st Cir. 1982);

Community Hosp. of Roanoke Valley, Inc. v. NLRB, 538 F.2d 607 (4th Cir. 1976).
73 See Sierra Publishing Co. v. NLRB; 889 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1989).
74 For more examples, see NLRB v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 660 F.2d 354, 356-57
(8th Cir. 1981) (holding that a press release announcing bus drivers' intent to drive
55 m.p.h. on Labor Day, and predicting delays, was protected because the plan was
expressly linked to contract grievances); Roadmaster Corp., 288 N.L.R.B. 1195 (1988)
(holding that union publicity concerning the alleged mislabeling of imported bicycles
to make them appear to have been domestically produced was protected). The chief
rationale for the generally more favorable treatment of product criticism that is
explicitly linked to a labor dispute seems to be that "third parties who receive appeals
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The real bite of Jefferson Standard is felt chiefly by employees,
particularly unorganized employees, with unselfish and entirely
genuine concerns that do not happen to involve traditional labor
objectives such as wages, hours, or job security. In such cases, the
courts are sometimes quite "generous" in their assessment of
apparently public-spirited actions-generous, that is, in the perverse
sense of straining to find a selfish, and therefore protected, motive
behind seemingly selfless behavior. In MisericordiaHospital Medical
Center v. NLRB, 75 for example, the Board ordered the reinstatement of a hospital nurse fired for preparing, together with a group
of her co-workers, a report to an accreditation body that was critical
of hospital policies. 'The report focused on problems involving
inadequate staffing and facilities, emergency room and admissions

policies,

and unsanitary conditions at the hospital, and was

concerned almost exclusively with the way these problems were
affecting patient care. But it also contained some minor and
incidental references to staff working conditions; on this tenuous
ground, the nurse's activity was held to be within the protection of
section 7.6 Misericordiais only one of a number of decisions that
appear to exaggerate, or even manufacture, the element of self77
interest that brings section 7 into play.

for support in a labor dispute will filter the information critically so long as they are
aware that it is generated out of that context." Sierra Publishing, 889 F.2d at 217.
Some decisions, however, have applied the Jefferson Standard doctrine to bar
"disparaging" or otherwise damaging comments even where they directly concerned
labor relations matters. See, e.g., NLRB v. Red Top, Inc., 455 F.2d 721, 727 (8th Cir.
1972) (holding that a threat to take work-related grievances to an employer's
customer was unprotected "disloyalty"). This approach has been criticized, however,
as "contrary to the overwhelming weight of authority." SierraPublishing,889 F.2d at
219; cf NLRB v. Pincus Bros., Inc., 620 F.2d 367, 376-77 (3d Cir. 1980) (deferring to
an arbitrator's denial of reinstatement on the grounds that the employee's
distribution of a leaflet critical of her employer and union with regard to wages and
other labor relations matters was "arguably unprotected" disloyalty).
75 246 N.L.R.B. 351 (1979), enforced, 623 F.2d 808 (2d Cir. 1980).
76 See id. at 356. The Board also relied on the nurses' professional obligation "to
act to improve the standards of nursing care and to join with others to meet the
public's health needs." Id. This argument, which would greatly expand the scope of
§ 7 protections for many professionals, see infra text accompanying notes 127-33, was
relegated to a footnote by the reviewing court, see Misericordia,623 F.2d at 814 n.9,
and has not appeared in other decisions. Cf Cordura Publications, Inc., 280 N.L.R.B.
230, 231 (1986) (relying on employees' desire to "increas[e] the professionalism of
their jobs" in finding their actions protected by § 7).
77 See, e.g., NLRB v. Oakes Mach. Corp., 897 F.2d 84, 89 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding
that employees' protest to higher management over company president's diversion
of resources to personal projects was protected because such diversion affected
company profitability and thus employee compensation); Squier Distrib. Co. v. Local
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The pattern in these cases is similar to that which emerges, as
Professor Richard Michael Fischl has shown, in cases involving
employees disciplined for actions taken for the sake of solidarity
with other workers, where there is little prospect for reciprocal
gain. 78 Thus, in Hendricks County Rural Electric Membership Corp.
v. NLRB, 7 9 for example, a secretary was fired for signing a petition
on behalf of an employee who had recently been discharged after
losing an arm in an on-the-job accident, rendering him unable to
perform his previous duties. The petition decried the fact that "no
one is willing to speak up or defend what is right if it might mean
jeopardizing one's own self," and proclaimed that "other people do
matter and Lloyd Hadley matters, to us and to many other people."8 0 The Board reinstated the secretary, but only after overcoming the hurdle posed by the manifestly unselfish nature of the
appeal by misconstruing the petition as motivated by the signatory
employees' concern for their own job security. 8 1 Here, too, there
is a perverse sort of "generosity" in the factfinders' determination
that apparently unselfish employee action was "really" motivated by
considerations of self-interest.
7, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 801 F.2d 238, 241 (6th Cir. 1986) (reinstating employees
fired for reporting the embezzlement of company funds because "[t]he employees'
overriding concern was dearly for their job security, and not for the efficacy of
managerial decisions"); Cordura Publications,280 N.L.R.B. at 231-32 (holding that
employees' letter to the chairman of the board was protected, despite its focus on
management practices and the quality of the employer's product (automobile
research), because such issues related to the poor treatment of employees);
Dominican Sisters of Ontario, Inc., 264 N.L.R.B. 1205, 1205 n.2 (1982) (concluding
that nurses' hiring of an attorney to address conditions in a hospital emergency room
was protected because, "[w]hile the letter [soliciting the attorney's services] ... was
couched in terms of the concern [the nurses] had about the effect of inadequate
staffing on patient care, it is implicit in the overall tenor of the letter that they were
protesting their inability to carry out their duties as emergency room nurses because
of alleged understaffing"); Professional Porter & Window Cleaning Co., 263 N.L.R.B.
136, 138-39 (1982) (finding that maids' complaints to building management about the
deteriorated condition of a building and the poor quality of cleaning materials were
protected because such complaints were related to a dispute over conditions of
employment).
78 See Fischl, supra note 21, at 801.
79 236 N.L.R.B. 1616 (1978), remanded on other grounds, 603 F.2d 25 (7th Cir.
1979), order reissued, 247 N.L.R.B. 498, enforcement denied, 627 F.2d 766 (7th Cir.

1980), rev'd with instructions to enforce, 454 U.S. 170 (1981). This case is discussed at
length in Fischl, supra note 21, at 793-96.
80 Hendricks County, 236 N.L.R.B. at 1620.
81 See id. at 1620 (noting that the employees' uniting might "not only serve
Hadley's interest but also their own as well"); Fischl, supra note 21, at 795-96.
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In many other cases, however, the decisionmakers have failed to
locate the necessary element of self-interest and have accordingly
denied protection. 82
Thus, employees distributing leaflets on
behalf of candidates "committed to working for the best interests of
working men and women" found themselves on the wrong side of
the line drawn in Eastex: the relationship between their politicking
and the terms and conditions of their own employment was too

"attenuated."83
The most interesting cases are those in which employee criticism
of an employer's own practices has fallen outside section 7 because
it was too unselfish. 84 One especially telling case involved counsel-

82 See Fischl,supra note 21, at 800-11. Professor Fischl explains that the courts (in

contrast to the Board) may take this approach to employee refusals to cross a picket
line where there is no realistic prospect of a reciprocal benefit to the noncrossing
employee. See, e.g., NLRB v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 189 F.2d 124, 129 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 885 (1951) (denying protection to employee actions that "could have
only been for the benefit and aid of those in a different bargaining unit. ... [and]
could have obtained nothing from [the employer] for [the protesters'] benefit"); cf.
NLRB v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Chem. Servs., Inc., 700 F.2d 385,389 (7th Cir. 1983)
(denying reinstatement of truck drivers who refused to cross a picket line at the
premises of their employer's customer).
83 Local 174, UAW v. NLRB, 645 F.2d 1151, 1152, 1154 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The
court so held even though the leaflet pointed to various governmental decisions in
which the winning candidates might participate that would directly affect terms and
conditions of employment. See id. at 1155. The UAW case is'targeted in Professor
Alan Hyde's cogent critique of the distinction drawn in Eastex between political
activity and "normal" economic activity for § 7 purposes. See Hyde, supra note 21; see
also Eagle Elec. Mfg. Co., 114 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1284, 1285 (1983) (advice memorandum of NLRB general counsel) (stating that employees' distribution of a leaflet in
support of a Mexican student leader seeking asylum was too remote from employment-related issues and therefore unprotected); Tektronix, Inc., 100 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
1635 (1979) (advice memorandum ofNLRB general counsel) (stating that distribution
of a "highly political and inflammatory" leaflet aimed primarily at "Nazi[] [collaborators] and ... capitalists," and only to a minor extent at working conditions, was
unprotected); cf Ford Motor Co., 221 N.L.R.B. 663, 666 (1975) (holding, in a preEastex decision, that a newsletter urging the creation of an independent workers'
party was "wholly political," and therefore unprotected), enforced, 546 F.2d 418 (3d
Cir. 1976). See generallyJames B. Atleson, Reflections on Labor,Power and Society, 44
MD. L. REV. 841,858-60 (1985) (describing and criticizing the exclusion of"political"
speech from § 7 protection); Hyde, supra note 21, at 9-17 (to the same effect).
84 In addition to the cases discussed below, see, e.g, Vincent v. Trend W.
Technical Corp., 828 F.2d 563, 565-66 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that employees'
reporting of their employer's violation of the terms of a government contract was
unprotected); NLRB v. Sheraton P.R. Corp., 651 F.2d 49, 52-53 (1st Cir. 1981)
(holding that employees' letter protesting, among other things, management's failure
to communicate with staff, the absence of innovation, and the lack of a marketing
plan, was insufficiently related to 'the direct concerns of the average worker," and
therefore unprotected); University of S. Cal. Sec. Dep't., 99 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1728,
1728-29 (1978) (advice memorandum of NLRB general counsel) (finding employees'
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ors at a home for emotionally disturbed children.8 5 The Board
lauded the employees' "staunch dedication to the worthy occupation
which they have chosen to pursue," and recognized that the
employees "work[ed] in an environment and for a cause-the
rehabilitation of troubled children-which must surely be steeped in
currents of emotion seldom encountered in more ordinary
employments." 86 Yet because the employees were motivated by
sincere concern for the quality of the care they were able to provide
and the welfare of the children in their custody, their actions were
held unprotected by section 7: they were not seeking to advance
87
their interests "as employees."
In many other cases, employee altruism does not fare well under
section 7. The Board denied protection to drug and alcohol
counselors fired for publicly criticizing their employer's ethics and
policies and their impact on adolescent patients.8 8 Unfortunately
for these employees, their criticisms "expressed a genuine concern
for the residents' living conditions," and were "not directly related
to the employees' working conditions." 89 Nursing home employees fired for testifying about patient conditions and possible abuse
were held unprotected because in so doing they had merely
expressed their concern for the patients. 90 Significantly, even
intemrnal criticism of this nature has been held unprotected because
of its too-attenuated link to conditions of employment. 91 Thus,
hospital employees who had complained internally about their
supervisor were denied protection because they "readily conceded
they were concerned with ...

the quality of care offered by the

program and the welfare of the children [and that their] energies
92
were not directed to improve their lot as employees."
On balance, there are fewer reported cases involving the status
under section 7 of employee criticism not directly related to terms
and conditions of employment than one might expect. 93 The
public criticism of campus safety unprotected because such complaints were not
related to working conditions).
85 See Lutheran Social Serv., 250 N.L.R.B. 35 (1980).
86 Id. at 35.
87 Id. at 42.
88 See Damon House, Inc., 270 N.L.R.B. 143, 143 (1984).
89 Id. at 143.
go See Autumn Manor, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 239, 242 (1983).
91 See Good Samaritan Hosp. & Health Ctr., 265 N.L.R.B. 618, 626 (1982).
92 Id. at 626.
93 The number of reported cases tells us little, however, about the prevalence of
this sort of activity, or of employer retaliation against it, because of the many points
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explanation may lie, in part, in the exclusive power of the General
Counsel to bring unfair labor practice complaints to the Board.9 4
Thus, in Daniel International, the case that provided the opening
scenario for this Article, the General Counsel refused even to file a
complaint on behalf of an employee fired for reporting allegedly
improper construction practices at a nuclear facility. 95 The
employee's concern, lamentably, was for the future safety of the
96
public, and not for his working conditions.
The analysis in these section 7 cases is precisely the opposite of
that which obtains in the public employee cases under Connick: if
the drug counselors or the nursing home employees or the nuclear
plant construction workers in these cases had been public employees claiming a right under the First Amendment, they probably
would have prevailed. 97 Their criticisms, untainted by any link to
personal grievances about working conditions, would have satisfied
at which potential complaints of this sort may be screened out prior to the decision
stage. First, only those employees who think to contact the NLRB with their problem
will attempt to file an unfair labor practice (ULP) charge. Given the popular
perception that the NLRB deals only with cases involving union activity-a perception
shared by almost all of my entering labor law students and most of my law school
colleagues-relatively few employees fired for protest outside the context of
unionization even approach the Board. Those who do contact the Board often get
no further than a telephone call, for only those whose inquiries are thought to fall
within the Act by the NLRB officer answering the call-that is, those involving protest
relating to terms and conditions of employment-are encouraged to file a charge.
Moreover, only those charges that the Regional Director or General Counsel
concludes are likely to prevail become the subject of formal complaints and are
litigated before the Board. There is no appeal from the General Counsel's refusal to
file a complaint on a ULP charge. See infra note 94. An informal survey of several
regional offices of the NLRB reveals that few calls of this nature come in and that
such calls are simply turned away in the absence of a link to unionization or terms
and conditions of employment.
94 See NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 23, 484 U.S.
112, 118-19 (1987) (noting that a charging party has no recourse if the General
Counsel declines to issue a ULP complaint).
95 See Daniel Int'l, 104 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1496, 1497 (1980). At that time, the fact
that the employee was apparently actingalone was not abar to § 7 protection. Under
the since-abandoned Alleluia Cushion doctrine, an individual filing a safety complaint
that would benefit her coworkers was deemed to be engaging in "concerted activity."
See infra text accompanying notes 203-11. The express basis of the decision in Daniel
Internationalwas that the employee's activity was not sufficiently related to terms and
conditions of employment to bring it within § 7.
96 See Daniel Int'l, 104 L.R.R.M. at 1497.
97 Conversely, had the nurse in Misericordiabeen a public employee claiming First
Amendment protection, she would have either failed to meet the public concern test
because of the link to her own working conditions, or perhaps succeeded in spite of it.
See supra text accompanying notes 75-77.
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the public concern test of Connick for the very same reasons for
which their claims under section 7 were rejected.
II. RECONCEIVING THE LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF EMPLOYEES
UNDER SECTION

7

The denial of section 7 protection to employees who act for the
sake of others-consumers, patients, clients, or the public generallyplainly pulls in the opposite direction from First Amendment
jurisprudence. Moreover, there is something jarring about the
98
privileging of self-interest over altruism in section 7 doctrine.
But is there even so much as an interesting paradox here? After all,
workplace issues, and particularly union organizing and collective
bargaining over wages and other terms and conditions of employment, are plainly at the heart of the NLRA. 99 Matters such as the
quality of the employer's product or service may seem far afield

from such issues.

Conversely, political speech, or speech on

"matters of public concern," is widely regarded as lying at the core
of the First Amendment. 10 0 Workplace grievances, even those of

98 It is worth noting, however, that the privileged status of employee activity in
pursuit of self-interest has a long history in labor jurisprudence. See infratext

accompanying notes 110-16.

9 See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988) (preamble to NLRA).
100 The view that the First Amendment protects only speech relevant to selfgovernment is closely associated with the scholarship of Alexander Meiklejohn. See,
e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT

22-27 (1948); Alexander Meiklejohn, The FirstAmendmentIs an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT.
REV. 245, 263 (asserting that "novels and dramas and paintings and poems" are
relevant to self-government, and therefore protected). For modern variations on the
Meiklejohn thesis, see Lillian R. BeVier, The FirstAmendment andPoliticalSpeech: An
Inquiry Into the Substance and Limits of Principle,30 STAN. L. REV. 299, 300-01 (1978),
and Robert H. Bork, NeutralPrinciplesandSome FirstAmendment Problems,47 IND. LJ.
1, 20 (1971). Professor Bork later publicly retreated from this position, calling it
"speculative, tentative," and downright "dumb." NominationofJudge RobertBork to be
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the Senate
Judiciary Comm., 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 264 (1987) (statement of Robert Bork).
The view that speech relevant to self-government is of central constitutional
significance continues to have a large following. See e.g.,JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DISTRUsT 93-94 (1980); Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment
Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 521 (1977). Others have taken issue with the
exclusive focus on matters of public concern, and have advanced a broader theory of
freedom of speech based on the inherent value of individual liberty and selfrealization. See, e.g., C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 3-5
(1989); THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6-9 (1970);
MARTIN H. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 19-40 (1984).
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public employees against their governmental employer, may seem
to be of peripheral importance at best.
There may appear to be nothing anomalous, then, in the
contrast that I have described. It is hard to dispute that section 7
and the First Amendment, at their core, inhabit different ends of
the spectrum running from particular work-related grievances to
broader political and social concerns. Even so, this spectrum cannot
be nicely divided as the two doctrines have purported to do. In
each case the seemingly "peripheral" concerns that are excluded
from protection-the political and product-related concerns of
private employees and the work-related concerns of public employees-are intimately related to the core purpose of the respective
guarantees of employee rights. The seemingly opposite limitations
imposed in the two realms both stem from a blindness to the
dynamic relationship between personal, concrete grievances at the
workplace and broader public concerns.
The consequence of this blindness in the context of section 7 is
not only to restrict unduly the scope of employee rights, but also to
deny to the public important information about the conduct of
significant economic actors. Drawing in part upon what the Court
now conceives as the central, and perhaps the sole, justification for
the constitutional protection of public employee speech-the
importance of speech on matters of public concern in a democratic
society-I argue for a broader interpretation of section 7 that
protects the right to communicate and protest about matters beyond
terms and conditions of employment.
A. The Interests of Employees Under Section 7
There is no doubt that the NLRA and section 7 of the Act were
primarily concerned with the promotion of independent labor
organizations and with collective bargaining over wages and other
terms and conditions of employment. 1° 1 The Act was passed in
the middle of the Great Depression, and raising wages was viewed
as one key to economic recovery. How should the broad language
of section 7 be read in light of this background? What does section
7 mean in this regard?
101 See generally IRVING BERNSTEIN, THE NEW DEAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
POLICY 100-02 (1950). The preamble to the Act expresses these economic objectives.
See National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, § 1, 49 Stat. 449,449
(1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988)).
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These questions seem to beckon us to study the legislative
history of the Act to determine what Congress intended by the
phrase "mutual aid or protection." That sort of inquiry is met with2
10
increasing skepticism in some quarters of both the judiciary
and the academy.1 03 Such skepticism is particularly well-placed
with respect to a provision like section 7: it was enacted over a halfcentury ago, and its broad, open-textured language seems ill-suited
to communicating a congressional intent to specify and delimit the
permissible objectives of joint employee activity. Indeed, I would
argue that section 7 presents a paradigmatic case for the application
of "dynamic statutory interpretation" of the sort advocated in
certain contexts by Professor William Eskridge.10 4 In other
words, it makes more sense to interpret the broad general language
of section 7 in light of the changing social context in which the
statute operates than to attempt to read the tea leaves left by the
1935 Congress that enacted that provision.'
This approach is
102 A tilt away from "purpose" or "intent," as divined from legislative history, and
toward the "plain meaning" of the text is a striking feature of the Supreme Court's
recent cases involving statutory interpretation. See Frederick Schauer, Statutory
Constructionand the CoordinatingFunction of PlainMeaning, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 231,
246; Cass R. Sunstein, InterpretingStatutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARv. L. REV.
405, 415-16 (1989) (providing examples of recent Supreme Court cases where
"textualism" is evident). Justice Scalia is the leading exponent of this approach. See
e.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527-30 (1989) (Scalia, J.
concurring in the judgment) ("The meaning of [statutory] terms ... ought to be
determined, not on the basis of which meaning can be shown to have been
understood by a larger handful of the Members of Congress;" but rather by (1) their
ordinary usage and (2) their compatibility with existing law and the statutory
framework); Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 97-100 (1989) (Scalia,J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment) (expressing skepticism concerning the use
of committee reports as "evidence of what the voting Members of Congress actually
had in mind" when a statute is enacted); Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,452-53 (1987) (Scalia,J., concurring in thejudgment)
("Judges interpret laws rather than reconstruct legislators' intentions. Where the
language of those laws is clear, we are not free to replace it with an unenacted
legislative intent."); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1175 (1989) (discussing the need for "general rules" from the Court and stating
that looking beyond the text of a statute is "essentially a discretion-conferring
approach").
103 For just a few of the scholarly expressions of skepticism about inquiry into

"legislative intent," see GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES

(1982); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, UpdatingStatutoryInterpretation,87 MICH. L. REV. 20
(1988); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation,135 U. PA. L. REV.
1479 (1987); Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretationand Legislative Supremacy, 78
GEo. LJ. 281 (1989).
104 See Eskridge, supra note 103, at 1496.
105 Interpreting the intent of Congress with respect to section 7 is especially
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all the more appropriate with respect to section 7 because the
evidence we do have suggests that Congress intended to create a
charter of worker rights with room for growth and change in the
nature of the objectives deemed important by workers them6
selves.

10

The Wagner Act, and section 7 in particular, was based not just
on an economic theory but on a commitment to the rights of
workers to join together and assert shared interests and concerns at
the workplace. In Senator Wagner's words, the Act was "'the next
step in the logical unfolding of man's eternal quest for freedom.'" 10 7 Supporters invoked basic freedoms of expression and
association in support of the rights affirmed in section 7.108 The
goals and interests in pursuit of which employees might exercise
those rights were not described by the familiar phrase "terms and
conditions of employment," even though variations on this language
were used elsewhere in the Act.1" 9 That phrase readily evoked
rather concrete matters like wages, hours, and job safety. Instead,
difficult. One must contend first with the belief held by many in 1935 that the
Wagner Act would be struck down as unconstitutional. See BERNSTEIN, supra note
101, at 120-23. Moreover, the Wagner Act reflects an unusually diverse set of overall
policies and objectives, as Karl Klare has shown. See Karl E. Klare, Judicial
Deradicalizationof the WagnerAct and the Origins ofModernJudicialConsciousness,19371941, 62 MINN. L. REv. 265 (1978) [hereinafter Klare, Judicial Deradicalization].
Professor Kiare has thus argued that the Act contained "radical" elements-that is,
elements "challenging rather than reinforcing the basic assumptions and power
relations of workplace institutions" that could have led to "radical" changes, although,
"[n]eedless to say, Congress did not 'intend' such changes." Karl E. Klare, Traditional
Labor Law Scholarship and the Crisis of Collective BargainingLaw: A Reply to Professor
Finkin, 44 MD. L. REv. 731, 758-59 (1985).
106 My argument is roughly parallel to that of H.Jefferson Powell with respect to
constitutional interpretation. See H. Jefferson Powell, The OriginalUnderstandingof
OriginalIntent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985). Professor Powell argues, in short, that
the originalist fixation on "the intent of the Founders" is wholly misplaced since the
Founders did not intend to fix the meaning of the Constitution by reference to their
own views about particular provisions. Id. at 930-32; see also Hans W. Baade, "Original
Intent" in HistoricalPerspective: Some Critical Glosses, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1001, 1024
(1991) (arguing that "the framers of the Constitution... did not intend to bequeath
their understanding of it to future generations in perpetuity"). I argue here,
similarly, that attempting to locate specific congressional intentions about the
objectives encompassed by section 7 is at odds with a congressional purpose to permit
labor to determine its own interests and objectives.
107 BERNSTEIN, supra note 101, at 115 (quoting Senator Wagner).
10s See id. at 147; see also infra notes 183-88 and accompanying text.
109 See National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, §§ 8(3), 9(a),
49 Stat. 449, 452-53 (1935). I am not arguing here that all of the matters discussed
herein, such as product quality and safety, are themselves "terms and conditions of
employment" subject to the duty to bargain collectively. See infra note 224.
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rather concrete matters like wages, hours, and job safety. Instead,
workers were granted the right to engage in "concerted activity for
mutual aid or protection."
By 1935, when that phrase made its way into the Wagner Act, it
had a short but respectable pedigree.1 10 It had first appeared in
section 2 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932.111 That Act
severely restricted the authority of federal courts to grant injunctive
relief in labor disputes; section 2 was a largely precatory statement
of national labor policy, which declared the basic right of workers
to engage in, collective bargaining and other "concerted activity for
mutual aid and protection" free from employer interference and
coercion. 12 The same language was subsequently incorporated
into section 7(a) of the ill-fated National Industrial Recovery Act of
1933 (NIRA), ll3 which for the first time gave employees federal
rights against employer interference, but which was temporary in
duration, virtually unenforceable in practice, and ultimately struck
down as unconstitutional. It is worth noting that it was William
Green, then President of the American Federation of Labor, who
urged Congress to carry over the phrase from Norris-LaGuardia into
the NIRA's declaration of worker rights.1 1 4 Subsequently, and
with very little further discussion,1 15 it was carried into section 7
of the NLRA where it became for the first tie an enforceable
110 The legislative history of this crucial language is recounted in detail in Fischl,
supra note 21, at 843-54, and in Robert A. Gorman & Matthew W. Finkin, The
Individualand the Requirement of 'Concert" Under the NationalLaborRelations Act, 130
U. PA. L. REV. 286, 331-46 (1981). I rely partly on their accounts.
"I Ch. 90, §§ 1-15, 47 Stat. 70, 70-73 (1932) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 101-115 (1988)).
112 The language of§ 2 was viewed by one of its chief drafters, Felix Frankfurter,
as "useful rhetoric... intended as an explicit avowal of the considerations moving
Congressional action."
INJUNCTION 212 (1930).

FELix FRANKFURTER & NATHAN GREENE, THE LABOR

Ch. 90, § 7(a), 48 Stat. 195, 198-99 (1933) (struck down in Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)). This section provided for the adoption
by trade associations of codes of fair competition, each of which was to contain a
condition that certain employee rights would be guaranteed.
114 As submitted to Congress, § 7(a) provided simply that "'employees shall have
the right to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing.'" Gorman & Finkin, supra note 110, at 337 (quoting H.R. 5564, 73d Cong.,
Ist Sess. § 7(a)(1) (1933)). Green urged the addition of the broader language,
including the right to engage in "other concerted activities for ... mutual aid or
protection," from § 2 of Norris-LaGuardia. NationalIndustrialRecovely: Hearingson
11

H.R. 5664 Before The House Comm. on Ways and Means, 73d Cong., lst Sess. 117 (1933)

(statement of William Green).

115 See Fischl, supra note 21, at 852.
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employee right backed by reasonably effective sanctions and
adjudication mechanisms.1 1 6 There is some evidence, then, that
the labor movement itself is responsible for the inclusion of the
"mutual aid or protection" language in what is now section 7. But
what did the phrase mean?
It seems very likely, as Professor Fischl has shown, that the
notion of "mutual aid or protection" has its roots in the labor
movement itself and its historic ethos of "mutualism" and solidarity:
support for the cause of another, often at some risk to one's own
immediate welfare, in the interest of the class and movement of
workers of which one is a part.1 17 Sometimes an act of solidarity
may be based on a realistic expectation of reciprocity some time in
the future. Often, however, it is not.118 This kind of solidarity,
which is the very soul of the labor movement, is not pure altruism,
but it defies the conventional view of rational self-interest. 119 It
was that conventional, narrow view of employees' self-interest that,
in part, animated a hostile federaljudiciary's condemnation of labor
activity-boycotts, picketing and strikes-the objective of which went
beyond the protester's own immediate wages and working conditions. 120 In incorporating the idea of mutualism into national
116 The lack of an effective enforcement scheme behind § 7(a) of the NIRA was
one of the primary shortcomings that backers of the NLRA sought to address. See
BERNSTEIN, supra note 101, at 100.
117 See Fischl, supra note 21, at 850-52. Professor Fischl draws heavily on the work
of the eminent labor historian David Montgomery. See DAvID MONTGOMERY, THE
FALL OF THE HOUSE OF LABOR 2-4, 171 (1987).

118 That is often the case when a worker refuses to cross a"stranger" picket line-a
picket line set up by a union other than the employee's own on behalf of employees
of an employer other than the employee's own. Often the risk to the employee of
discharge or permanent replacement, not to mention a temporary loss of pay, is not
remotely outweighed by the fairly speculative possibility of reciprocity by the
"stranger" union in the future. See Fischl, supra note 21, at 801 & n.36.
119 As Fischl has written, the concept of "mutual support" echoed in § 7 is "an
idea born of working-class experience, at odds with the crude individualism suggested
by the mere promise of reciprocity, and steeped in notions of community and
'brotherhood.'" Id. at 857. This view is reflected, he argues, in an influential but
frequently misunderstood decision by Judge Learned Hand, NLRB v. Peter Cailler
Kohler Swiss Chocolates Co., 130 F.2d 503, 505-06 (2d Cir. 1942) ("The rest know
that by their action each one of them assures himself, in case his turn ever comes, of
the support of the one whom they are all then helping, and the solidarity so
established is 'mutual aid' in the most literal sense, as nobody doubts."). See Fischl,
supra note 21, at 856-57.
120 As Professor Fischl recounts, by the late 19th century labor's infliction of
economic injury was usually privileged "only to the extent that the challenged conduct
had as its purpose or object the advancement of the self-interest of the protesters."
Fischl, supra note 21, at 843. Most courts found the requisite self-interest in strikes
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labor policy, first with the Norris-LaGuardia Act and later with the
NLRA, Congress can best be characterized as having rejected the
pervasive hostility toward collective worker action that looked
beyond immediate economic advantage in favor of the labor
121
movement's own more generous conception of its self-interest.
This understanding of the origins of the term "mutual aid or
protection" clearly calls for an extension of section 7 protection to
include support of other employees, even absent any distinct
expectation of reciprocal support in the future.1 22 To be sure,
the infusion of section 7 with historic ideals of solidarity among
workers does not by itself tell us much about the sorts of interests
that workers were thought to have so as to justify "concerted activity
for mutual aid or protection." But it does suggest that the insistence on a self-interested economic motive for concerted activity is
misconceived, and it thus opens the door to employee concerns, like
those I have discussed, that lie some distance from labor's traditionfor higher wages and better working conditions, but there was far less tolerance for
employees' support for similar actions of other employees, or for economic pressure
in support of union recognition. See id. at 843-44. The hostility toward concerted
action, together with the limited privilege based in self-interest, established in the
common law, came to be incorporated into the federal courts' interpretation of the
Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7
(1988)), and even the Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1988)), which had sought to limit the federal courts'
intervention in labor disputes. The result was that labor activity in support of ends
regarded as too remote from the immediate self-interest of protesters, such as
secondary pressures, was held to be an unlawful restraint of trade. See Duplex
Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921); Fischl, supra note 21, at 843-45.
121 See Fischl, supra note 21, at 843-45. The drafters of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
were chastened by the federal courts' ability, demonstrated in Duplex Printing,to
evade Congress's attempts to modify the substantive law governing labor activity; they
therefore focused on limiting the courts'jurisdiction. See id. at 846-48. The statute
contained a very broad definition of "labor disputes," the jurisdiction of which was
sharply limited, see Norris-LaGuardia Act, ch. 90, §13(c), 47 Stat. 70, 73 (1932)
(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1988)), so to break out of the narrow conception of
employees' "self-interest" that the courts had recognized. See Fischl, supra note 21,
at 848-49. The Supreme Court has thus repeatedly rejected the view that the NorrisLaGuardia Act ousts the courts' injunctive powers only where the activity is motivated
by the protesters' economic self-interest. See e.g., Burlington N.R.R. v. Brotherhood
of Maint. of Way Employees, 481 U.S. 429,440-43 (1987) (applying Norris-LaGuardia
to secondary boycott activity, and rejecting the view that protest must further the
union's economic interests); Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. International
Longshoremen's Ass'n., 457 U.S. 702, 713-14 (1982) (rejecting the view that
"economic self-interest" is necessary for Norris-LaGuardia to be implicated, and
applying the Act to a political boycott of ships from the Soviet Union).
122 See Fischl, supra note 21, at 842 (suggesting that this broader "interpretation
is more consonant... with the contemporaneous understanding of the provision").
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al economic demands but that still plainly arise from the work
experience.
Having located the origins of the term "mutual aid or protection" in the early labor movement, we might follow that road
further and look to that movement's own conception of the range
of legitimate employee interests. But. the value of this inquiry is
questionable, for it seems that the history of the early twentiethcentury labor movement could support nearly any view of the
interests of labor. There is no doubt that the chief concerns of the
labor movement then, as now, were wages, hours, job security,
workplace safety and the like. 123 But the movement was diverse
and unruly, and contained within it socialist, communist, and
reformist elements whose programs ran the gamut from proletarian
revolution and worker control of industry, to opposition to World
War I, the establishment of public kindergartens, the institution of
124
tax reform, and the improvement of social welfare benefits.

12 The dominant forces within the American labor movement in that period,
embodied in the American Federation of Labor (AFL) and particularly in the person
and philosophy of Samuel Gompers, came to be distinguished by their narrow focus
on the immediate economic interests of their members and on the use of collective
bargaining and economic pressure to advance those interests. See IRVING BERNSTEIN,
THE LEAN YEARS: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WORKER 90-94 (1960); MoNTGOMERY, supra note 117, at 6. But it was not always so. At the turn of the century,
Gompers himself was proclaiming the broad social and political objectives of the labor
movement. See William E. Forbath, The Shaping of the American Labor Movement, 102
HARv. L. REV. 1109, 1145-48 (1989). William Forbath has argued persuasively that
the AFL's shift to "voluntarism" and hostility to state intervention grew in large part
out of its crushing experiences with reform efforts in the era of substantive due
process and with the oppressive regime of "government by injunction" in labor
disputes. See id. at 1234-35. In any event, the AFL's commitment to pure
voluntarism was shattered by the Great Depression. See BERNSTEIN, supra, at 345-55.
Those within the Federation favoring greater government intervention won a decisive
victory with the AFL's endorsement of unemployment insurance. See id. at 353-54.
124 In the evocative words of Professor Montgomery, "[b]efore the 1920s the
house of labor had many mansions." MONTGOMERY, supra note 117, at 6. For
discussions of the diversity of the American labor movement in this period, see
BERNSTEIN, supra note 123, at 136-42; DAVID MONTGOMERY, WORKERS' CONTROL IN
AMERICA 104-08 (1979); RICHARD H. TAWNEY, THE AMERICAN LABOUR MOVEMENT
AND OTHER ESSAYS 39 (J.M. Winter ed., 1979); Forbath, supra note 123, at 1125.
Some of the most influential union leaders in the AFL of the 1920s and 1930s were
the advocates of "industrial unionism" who went on to form the Congress of
Industrial Organizations in 1937. The industrial unionists broke from the AFL's old
guard chiefly over the manner in which labor should be organized in the emerging
mass-production industries to best advance their shared economic interests. But they
also differed from the AFL in regard to their willingness to adopt political means and
broader political aims. The early CIO pressed, for example, for much of the New
Deal program apart from the Wagner Act and for tax reform. See TAWNEY, supra,at
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Surely Congress, in borrowing the term "mutual aid or protection"
from labor's lexicon, cannot be presumed to have incorporated the
revolutionary objectives for which some in labor's ranks agitated.
By the same token, the labor movement did not speak with one
voice on the strictly economic aims and interests of labor. Congress's use of open-textured language with roots in the labor
movement itself seems designed not so much to insist on a
particular vision of the interests of labor as it is to allow workers to
speak for themselves and to choose the appropriate objects of their
concern. The language invites us to listen to workers' own
conceptions of their interests "as employees" rather than attempting
to define those interests for them.
1. Employee Concerns About Product Quality
Current doctrine is based on the premise that employees are not
advancing their interests as employees when they criticize their
employer's products or services. This very formulation of the issue
is revealing, for it obscures the fact that the "employer's" product
or service is very often the employees' own work product.
But surely employees do have a genuine interest as employees
in the quality of what they collectively produce. First, and most
obviously, employees have a direct economic interest in the ongoing
success of the enterprise on which their livelihoods depend. But
employees' interest in the quality of their work product cannot be
wholly ascribed to "rational self-interest," if that is thought to
exclude genuine concern for quality and for the interests of others
such as consumers. An employee's job satisfaction may turn just as
much on her ability to take pride in the product of her efforts and
in the institution of which she is a part as on her wages and the
physical conditions in which she works. 125 An employee's selfinterest and her interest in the quality of the product or service she
helps provide converge in the pride and self-realization that come
from contributing something of value to the community.
Considerations both of economic security and of personal
satisfaction, depending as they do on the success of the organization, strongly inhibit employees' willingness to "go public" with
25

1

See ROBERT BLAUNER, ALIENATION AND FREEDOM atvii-ix (1964) (asserting that

"the nature of a man's work affects his social character and personality... and his
over-all sense of worth and dignity"); RENsIs LIKERT, THE HUMAN ORGANIZATION 51

(1967) (suggesting that employees desire, in addition to economic security, "to be
proud of the company they work for and of its performance and accomplishments").
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tion, strongly inhibit employees' willingness to "go public" with
criticism of the employer. 26
But those same considerations
might also eventually push employees in the other direction,
especially if efforts to address the problem internally are frustrated.
Employees might even conclude that criticizing the employer's
product or service-informing the public of problems and pressuring
the employer to institute changes-serves the long-run interests of
the enterprise and its employees.
Professional employees, who are covered by the Act, provide
some of the most obvious examples. 127 Can it be doubted that
the job satisfaction of nurses is intimately bound up with the welfare
of their patients? 128 That lawyers are committed to providing
adequate representation to their clients? 129 That journalists are
concerned about the caliber of the information they and their
publication provide to the public?130 And that each of these
groups of employees has these concerns because of the work they
do? It is strong evidence of the depth and sincerity of these
concerns that professional employee unions have sought, often
successfully, to bargain over these professional matters, 131 for this
presumably demonstrates their willingness to trade off potential
economic demands for the sake of promoting professional concerns.
Moreover, many professional employees are bound by professional
ethics to act in the interest of their patients or clients and to adhere
to standards of professional integrity that transcend whatever
obligations of loyalty they may have to their employer. To the
extent an employer's actions and policies undermine its employees'
ability to meet professional standards, the employees may deem
126 There are, of course, other constraints, such as the fear of employer
retaliation. See infra text accompanying notes 231-33.
127
See generally David M. Rabban, Can American Labor Law Accommodate Collective
Bargainingby ProfessionalEmployees?, 99 YALE L.J. 689, 691, 714-16 (1990) (giving
examples of professional employees seeking to advance "professional" concerns
through collective bargaining).
128 See id. at 715 (noting nurses' negotiation of provisions securing hospital
adherence to professional nursing standards) (citing LYNDIA FLANAGAN, COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AND THE NURSING PROFESSION 18-25 (American Nurses' Ass'n 1983)).

129 See id. (noting legal aid attorneys' negotiation for opportunities to address
"issues of project-wide significance").
130 See id. (noting reporters' negotiation for control over revisions) (citing Gail L.
Barwis, ContractualNewsroom Democracy, 57 JoURNALISM MONOGRAPHS 1, 15, 17-18
(1978)).
151 See Rabban, supranote 127, at 714-16; see also David M. Rabban, Is Unionization
Compatiblewith Professionalism?,45 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 97, 110 (1991) (describing
the treatment of professional concerns in collective bargaining agreements).
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themselves obligated to criticize and to attempt to change those
policies.1 12 To define criticism of this sort as indefensible "product disparagement," unrelated to "the interests of employees as
employees," is to misunderstand and demean thejob experiences of
133
these employees.
Highly trained professionals are not, however, the only employees who transcend parochial pocketbook concerns. Abundant
anecdotal evidence demonstrates the interest of nonprofessional
employees in the quality and safety of the product or service they
produce. The common law jurisprudence of "wrongful discharge"
is replete with cases of secretaries, technicians, and other nonprofessional private employees who were discharged for expressing their
concern about the safety or quality of the employer's product or
service. 134 In interviews, craft workers,1 3 5 construction work132

Cf Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will vs. IndividualFreedom: On Limiting

the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1404, 1408-09 (1967)
(describing the dilemma of professionals faced with an employer's demand that they
violate professional ethics).
133 A glimmer of recognition of this point is buried in the decisions of the Board,
and to a lesser extent of the court of appeals, in Misericordia Hosp. Medical Ctr., 246
N.L.R.B. 351 (1979), enforced, 623 F.2d 808 (2d Cir. 1980), discussedsupra notes 75-77
and accompanying text. As a supporting rationale for protecting the nurses' report
on patient conditions, the Board cited the nurses' obligation "to act to improve the
standards of nursing care and to join with others to meet the public's health needs."
Misericordia,246 N.L.R.B. at 356. Broad acceptance of this argument would markedly
expand the scope of section 7 protections for many professionals, for it would
recognize that their shared concerns as professional employees necessarily encompass
the concerns of those persons they are committed to serving and the standards they
are pledged to maintain. The argument was relegated to a footnote by the reviewing
court, see Misericordia,623 F.2d at 814 n.9, which upheld the Board's decision based
on the report's incidental reference to working conditions. I have been unable to
locate any other decisions recognizing this kind of link between the interests of
employees and the interests of others.
134 Such conduct is sometimes found to state a case for wrongful discharge under
the "public policy" exception to the general presumption that employment is "at will."
See, e.g., Boyle v. Vista Eyewear, 700 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (lab helper fired
for reporting employer's failure to perform federally mandated safety tests on
eyeglasses); McQuary v. Bel Air Convalescent Home, Inc., 684 P.2d 21, 23 (Or. Ct.
App. 1984) (employee fired for threatening to report violation of nursing home
patient's rights under state law); cf. White v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 669
(10th Cir. 1990) (employees fired for complaining of brake defects would state
wrongful discharge claim but for valid release).
In other similar cases the "employment at will" doctrine bars the employees'
wrongful discharge claims. See, e.g., Guyv. Travenol Labs, Inc., 812 F.2d 911 (4th Cir.
1987) (supervisor at drug manufacturing plant fired for refusing to falsify records of
quality and quantity of drugs); Tritle v. Crown Airways, Inc., 751 F. Supp. 585
(S.D. W. Va. 1989) (airline employee fired for complaining of pilot's safety violations);
English v. General Elec. Co., 683 F. Supp. 1006 (E.D.N.C. 1988) (radiation lab
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ers,13 6 auto workers, 137 and waitresses1 38 describe pride in
what they produce as an important element of their work experience. It seems likely that many nursing aides, child care -workers,
and other nonprofessional employees of private service-oriented
organizations, who tend to be relatively low-paid, may have chosen
these less lucrative jobs because of the satisfaction they gain from
serving people and doing good.
There is overwhelming evidence that workers want to contribute
meaningfully to a socially productive enterprise, to produce highquality goods, and to deliver a valuable service. 139 Some work
experiences satisfy the deep-seated desire to identify with and take
pride in the product of one's labors, resulting in enhanced "job

technician allegedly fired for complaining of safety violations at nuclear fuel plant);
Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174 (Pa. 1974) (salesman fired for
complaining about product quality); cf. Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479 (3d Cir.
1987) (employee fired for refusing to falsify quality control reports failed to state a
claim under the public policy exception to the at-will doctrine, though the claim was
not "frivolous").
135 See STUDS TERKEL, WORKING at xlv-xlix (1974) (quoting stone mason Carl
Murray Bates as he talks about his work and its meaning); id. at 517-19 (quoting
carpenter Nick Lindsay who discusses satisfaction in doing good work). See generally
BLAUNER, supra note 125, at 51-57 (describing the satisfaction felt by printers with
challenging and creative work).
136 See TERKEL, supra note 135, at 26 (crane operator Hub Dillard: "There's a
certain amount of pride-I don't care how little you did. You drive down the road
and you say, 'I worked on this road.'. . . [T]here's a certain pride knowing you did

your bit.... It's food for your soul that you know you did it good.").

137 See id. at 177 (auto worker Ned Williams: "You see [a car] on that highway, you
don't look and see what model it is or whose car it is. I put my labor in it. And
somebody just like me put their area of work in it. It's got to be an area of
proudness.").
138 See id. at 296-97 (waitress Dolores Dante: "I'd get intoxicated with giving
service. People would ask for me and I didn't have enough tables.... That's a
compliment.... You really want to pleasure your guests.... I tell everyone I'm a
waitress and I'm proud.").
13 9
See SPECIAL TASK FORCE TO THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND
WELFARE, WORK IN AMERICA 13 (1973) [hereinafter WORK IN AMERICA] ("What the
workers want most, as more than 100 studies in the past 20 years show, is to become
masters of their immediate environments and to feel that their work and they
themselves are important."); see also BLAUNER, supra note 125, at viii (stating that the
nature of one's work affects one's "over-all sense of worth and dignity"); DENNIS A.
GILBERT, COMPENDIUM OF AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION 414 (1988) (describing the
results of an opinion poll in which over 90% of respondents said that the quality of
their company's product or service is important to them); LIKERT, supra note 125, at
51 (noting that studies show that employees want to be able to take pride in their
company's performance and accomplishments); MIKE PARKER & JANE SLAUGHTER,
CHOOSING SIDES: UNIONS AND THE TEAM CONCEPT 98 (1988) ("Workers... like to
be identified with a company and a product that their friends and neighbors see as
high caliber.").
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satisfaction," morale, and productivity. 140 Other job experiences
frustrate those desires, yielding employee alienation, high turnover,
and even sabotage. 141 The auto industry stood for many years as
the textbook illustration of the alienation and demoralization
fostered by the assembly-line production method. 42 But the
desire of workers to make, a contribution and to take pride in their
work is hardy, and lies ready to be cultivated even after decades of
neglect. The experience of the United Auto Workers and General
Motors offers a case in point and vividly demonstrates the depth of
143
employee concerns about product quality.
140

See, e.g., BLAUNER, supranote 125, at 51-57 (describing satisfaction in the craft

of printing); EDWARD E. LAWLER ET AL., EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT IN AMERICA: A
STUDY OF CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE 46-48 (1989) (noting that large firms using
"employee involvement" mechanisms report heightened worker satisfaction (76%of
firms), as well as improved quality (72%) and productivity (69%)): WORK IN AMERICA,
supra note 139, at 96-105 (describing the success of programs to redesign jobs and
enlist employee participation).
141 See BLAUNER, supra note 125, at 21-24 (1964) (asserting that a lack of any
control over the pace and processes of work renders it meaningless to the worker);
HARRY BRAVERMAN, LABOR AND MONOPOLY CAPITAL 31-35 (1974) (explaining how
job dissatisfaction may manifest itself in high absenteeism and quit rates); WORK IN
AMERICA, supra note 139, atxvi-xvii (stating thatjob dissatisfaction is common in both
blue and white collar jobs, and cuts across race, age, and gender lines); see also
TERKEL, supra note 135, at xxxi (steelworker Mike Lefevre: "You can't take pride
anymore.... It's hard to take pride in a bridge you're never gonna cross, in a door
you're never gonna open. You're mass-producing things and you never see the end
result of it."). Terkel also quotes Gary Bryner, president of a UAW local in Ohio:
Assembly workers ... have no enthusiasm about pride in workmanship.
They could care less if the screw goes in the wrong place.... The guys are
not happy here. They don't come home thinking, Boy, I did a great job
today and I can't wait to get back tomorrow.... He's not concerned at all
if the product's good, bad or indifferent.
Id. at 192-93; see also infra note 142.
142 See BLAUNER, supra note 125, at 5-6, 98-123; BRAVERMAN, supra note 141, at
32-34. Emma Rothschild describes GM's Lordstown plant after a famous strike in
1972 as "a world center of worker alienation." EMMA ROTHSCHILD, PARADISE LOST:
THE DECLINE OF THE AUTO-INDUSTRIAL AGE 97 (1973).
The strike vote came after months of struggle: a change in plant
management, layoffs, a disciplinary crackdown, an increase in car defects,
complaints by workers about the speeding up of monotonous assembly-line
tasks, slowdowns, high absenteeism, repeated allegations by GM of worker
sabotage. Workers claimed that supervisors authorized shipment of
defective cars; the company claimed that workers attacked the paint, body,
upholstery, and controls of the Vegas.
Id. at 101.
14' This is not to say that these developments will become the salvation of General
Motors, the woes of which have many deep roots. See Doron P. Levin, Experts Doubt
Cutbacks Alone Will Save G.M., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1991, at Al.
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Since 1941 the company-wide collective bargaining agreement
between the UAW and GM has proclaimed their joint commitment
to product quality. 44 But until recently this commitment was not
reflected in any active effort to solicit or respond to the knowledge
and concerns that line workers had about design or manufacturing
issues. 145 Increased competition in the automobile market forced
a reexamination of the quality issue, prompting GM, together with
the UAW and other unions, to create a "Quality Network" aimed in
part at involving workers at all levels in decisions about product
quality. In recent years the UAW has successfully negotiated for
contract provisions guaranteeing extensive worker and union
involvement in quality issues.1 46 Indeed, in its most recent round
of contract negotiations with GM, the UAW sought the right to
strike over product quality. 147 Instead the union secured a new
procedure permitting line workers to raise issues relating to product
quality and to initiate a sort of "quality grievance" that can be taken
all the way up the corporate ladder, with union involvement at every
48

step.1

The experience of the UAW and GM demonstrates the importance of quality issues to the employees, as represented by their
union. The union's willingness to expend finite bargaining leverage
on securing guarantees of worker participation in quality issues is
convincing evidence of genuine interest and concern among
employees. Further evidence is found in employee attitudes about
their work:
the company's research reveals widespread and
increased interest among autoworkers in the quality of what they
produce, as well as improved job satisfaction, stemming, at least in
149
part, from their involvement in these issues.
144 AGREEMENT BETWEEN GENERAL MOTORS CORP. AND THE UAW 1 (1941) (copy

on file with author).
145 On the contrary, autoworkers who expressed concerns of this nature were
often frustrated by their supervisors' and management's lack of interest. See, e.g.,
RoTHscHILD, supra note 142, at 97 (quoted supra note 142); TERKEL, supra note 135,
at 162 (autoworker Phil Stallings: "Proud of my work? How can I feel pride in ajob
where I call a foreman's attention to a mistake, a bad piece of equipment, and he'll
ignore it. Pretty soon you get the idea they don't care.").
146 See UAW-GM Memorandum of Commitment to Product Quality, in AGREEMENT
BETWEEN GENERAL MOTORS CORP. AND THE UAW, SEPT. 17, 1990 at 565-67
[hereinafter GM-UAW AGREEMENT].
147 Conversations with UAW and GM officials (Mar. 14, 1991) (notes on file with

author).

148 See GM-UAW AGREEMENT, supra note 146, at 418-21 (describing "an
expeditious process flow for employees to voice their product quality concern[s]").
149 Conversation with GM officials (Mar. 14, 1991) (notes on file with author).
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The story is exemplary, but not unique. "Quality circles" and
other programs to encourage employee participation in all aspects
of the production process have proliferated in many areas of
industry."' Those programs are founded in large part on the fact,
repeatedly verified in empirical studies, that such involvement
enhances employee job satisfaction, longevity, and productivity, as
well as product quality. 5 1 Much of modern labor relations and
personnel practices in both union and nonunion workplaces is thus
founded on the premise that employees have an inherent, if
sometimes latent, concern for the nature and quality of what they
produce. It is an interest that employees generally share with
employers, and indeed employers have begun to understand and to
150 Another good example ofjoint labor-management efforts to improve quality
and efficiency is provided by the Xerox Corporation and the Amalgamated Clothing
and Textile Workers Union. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, TRACING A TRANSFORMATION
IN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS: THE CASE OF XEROX CORPORATION AND THE AMALGAMATED CLOTHING AND TEXTILE WORKERS UNION (1988) [hereinafter TRACING A
TRANSFORMATION]. The growing trend toward employee involvement is confirmed

by a mammoth study of employee involvement in almost 500 "Fortune 1000" firms
conducted for the General Accounting Office by the Center for Effective Organizations at the University of Southern California. See LAWLER ET AL., supra note 140, at
29-30. Some 70% of the respondents reported some form of worker involvement,
particularly "quality circles," id. at 25, defined as structured employee participation
in groups in which volunteers meet to identify quality and productivity-related
problems and suggest improvements. See id. at 79.
151 This link between greater employee involvement in such matters as improving
product quality and an increase in work satisfaction is confirmed by the large-scale
GAO study referred to in the previous note. Over three-quarters of those
respondents who had implemented some form ofworker involvement plan reported
improved worker satisfaction; over two thirds also reported improved productivity,
quality of product or service, and customer service. See id. at 46-48; see also TRACING
A TRANSFORMATION, supra note 150, at 11-12 (stating that volunteer participants in
a "quality of worklife" program at Xerox reported improvements in morale and in
their attachment to the job and to the firm, and that the program contributed
positively to productivity, labor relations, and the union itself).
Not all of these programs genuinely enhance employee control at work; indeed,
some labor activists argue that unions should resist participation schemes such as the
"team concept." See PARKER & SLAUGHTER, supra note 139, at 39-59; MIKE PARKER,
INSIDE THE CIRCLE: A UNION GUIDE TO QWL (1985). These "adversarialists" argue
that such cooperation schemes are simply sophisticated speed-up devices that exploit
workers and undermine labor militancy, which they view as the only viable path to
real power for employees. See PARKER & SLAUGHTER, supra note 139, at 41. But see
Karl E. Klare, The Labor-Management Cooperation Debate: A Workplace Democracy
Perspective,23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 39, 82 (1988) (disagreeing with the claim made
by adversarialists that conflict is the only method of securing labor rights). At the
very least, all participants in the debate embrace the crucial point that workers have
an interest in matters such as the quality of their work product and in having a voice
in such matters. See PARKER & SLAUGHTER, supra note 139, at 35, 98; Klare, supra,
at 44-45.
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capitalize on the value employees place on producing a quality
product. But it is also an interest that, like concerns about wages
and working conditions, can bring employees into conflict with
management. The open-textured language of section 7, read in
light of the overwhelming evidence of the meaning of work for
employees, should lead to the protection of employees' right to
express their own concerns about the quality of the product or
service they produce.
2. Other Employee Concerns Beyond Terms and Conditions of
Employment: The Case of Environmental Issues
There has been no comparable proliferation of employersponsored "environmental circles" designed to stimulate greater
employee concern about and participation in employer practices
affecting the environment. Employers do not have the same
obvious market-based incentives to improve environmental
performance that they face with regard to product quality. The
incentive to reduce pollution and other environmental harmsclassic "externalities" of the production process-depends not on
ordinary market forces but largely upon legal compulsion, and the
cost of compliance with environmental mandates is often a drag on
productivity and profits. Stricter environmental regulation has
therefore sometimes been perceived by employees as a threat to job
security and wage levels, and has sometimes been opposed by labor
1 52
unions on those grounds.
To some extent that is changing. Public concern about the
environment has mushroomed in recent years, leading to stricter
15 3
regulation, more vigorous enforcement, and larger fines.
Moreover, there is an emerging consumer preference for environ152 SeeJames C. Oldham, OrganizedLabor, the Environment, and the Taft-HartleyAct,
71 MICH. L. REV. 935, 940-42 (1973); Pope, supra note 56, at 912. Under Eastex, it
is clear that employee protest of environmental regulation on these grounds would

generally be protected under § 7. See supra notes 21-29 and accompanying text.
153 See generally Matthew L. Wald, Earth Day at 20: How Green the Globe?, N.Y.
TImEs, Apr. 22, 1990, § 1, at 1 (documenting some environmental progress as
concern for the environment reaches major corporations). This increased concern
has been manifested in legislation such as the federal Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7401-7642 (1988), in tougher state regulation, see, e.g., Richard W. Stevenson,
Facing Up to a Clean-Air Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1989, at D1 (describing new air
pollution regulations in California), and in proposals for tax incentives and penalties
based on environmental practices, see BarnabyJ. Feder, Protectingthe Environment:
How Much Can Tax Policy Do?, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 15, 1990, § 3, at 7.
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mentally sound products.1 54 Both of these developments have
obvious bottom-line consequences: the economic interest of the
firm and its employees seems increasingly to be served by responsible environmental practices.
But there are other grounds for employee concern about these
matters. As with product quality, employees have a legitimate stake
in being part of an enterprise that does good and not harm. This
is particularly true when the employees themselves are required by
the employer to engage in conduct that is damaging to the environment. Moreover, as residents of the community in which the
employer operates, employees are especially likely to be affected by
employer practices that contaminate the air, water, and soil in a
locality. 55 For all these reasons, employees do protest offenses
against the environment and environmental regulations, 15 6 and
some labor unions have taken an affirmative stance on environmental issues, often together with community groups. 157 The UAW
and other unions have attempted to bargain over environmental
issues, and have undertaken worker education programs with
154 See John Holusha, So, What Is 'EnvironmentallyFriendly, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26,

1991, § 1, at 50; Keith Schneider, Can Shoppers Tell ifSomething Is Really Goodfor the
Planet?, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1991, § 4, at 6.
155 See Oldham, supra note 152, at 946-53.
156
See id. at 953-55. Wrongful discharge cases again provide examples. See, e.g.,
Trombetta v. Detroit, T. & I.R.R., 265 N.W.2d 385, 388 (Mich. Ct. App.) (employee
fired for refusing to falsify sampling data for pollution control reports to state), app.
denied, 403 Mich. 855 (1978); Phipps v. Clark Oil & Ref. Corp., 408 N.W.2d 569,57071 (Minn. 1987) (service station employee discharged for refusing to violate federal
law by pumpingleaded gasoline into vehicle designed for unleaded gasoline); Sabine
Pilot Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733, 734-35 (Tex. 1985) (deckhand fired for
refusing to pump bilges into water in violation of federal law).
157 See, e.g., Frances F. Marcus, LaborDisputelnLouisianaEnds withEcologicalGain,
N.Y. TIMEsJan. 3,1990, atA16 (describing Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Union's
successful campaign for tighter environmental regulation). See generally Oldham,
supranote 152, at 966-77 (describing the efforts of several major unions to have input
into environmental decisions); Pope, supra note 56, at 903-04 (describing an overlap
between workers' concerns about pollution and those of the larger community). As
early as 1970, at the urging of its long-time president Walter Reuther, the UAW
resolved:
Unchecked pollution by the automobile and related industries is of
direct concern to auto workers not only because they are citizens concerned
for their environment but because there is a direct threat to their jobs and
theirjob security. The worker's stake in resolving this problem for society
and the nation is compounded by the stake in his ownjob. We shall raise
this issue sharply in 1970 negotiations in discussions with the companies.
Oldham, supra note 152, at 936-37.
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respect to them. 158 Those activities reflect legitimate employee
concerns growing out of their participation in the production
process. To the extent the activities are concerted in nature, they
should be protected by section 7.159

My claim is not that workers are uniformly selfless and publicspirited. Wages and benefits are necessarily foremost among the
concerns of employees. Concerns about the quality of the product,
the environmental practices of the employer, or other issues of
public interest may be secondary at best for most employees.
Moreover, these concerns may themselves be inextricable from the
employees' collective long-term interest in job security. But can it
fairly be said, as a categorical matter, that the employer's toxic
contamination of the surrounding community or the quality of the
collective work product is of less legitimate concern to employees
than, for example, the price of soft drinks in employer-provided
vending machines? 160 As a matter of national labor policy, should
employees be encouraged to focus their energies wholly on the
latter rather than on matters such as quality and compliance with
environmental and other public duties?
Like solidarity among workers, concern about the work product
and other outside effects of the production process, such as
environmental practices, is neither strictly self-interested nor wholly
altruistic. It is a reflection of workers' ability to see connections
between their own interests "as employees" and the interests they
16 1
share with other consumers and citizens of their communities.
Much the same can be said of "political activity" whose relationship
to employees' terms and conditions of employment may appear
"attenuated": employees may, in part through their participation in
a union and other concerted activity at the workplace, develop a
158 See Oldham, supra note 152, at 967-71.
159 Professor Oldham concluded in 1973 that such activity was generally already
protected. See id. at 1002-03. I must disagree. His analysis of the status of such
activities under § 7 relies largely on cases involving occupational health issues. See
id. at 1003-08. If complaints about contamination or pollution of the work
environment are put aside, most cases involving environmental complaints do not
entail the direct effect on working conditions that is generally a prerequisite to § 7
protection.
160 The latter has been held to constitute a "condition of employment" about
which the employer is required to bargain under § 8(a)(5) and § 8(d). See Ford Motor
Co. v. NLRB (Chicago Stamping Plant), 441 U.S. 488, 498-500 (1979).
161 ProfessorJames Pope demonstrates how the cultivation of those connections
holds out the promise for a reinvigoration of labor activism, if only it can overcome
the traditional constraints of the labor laws. See Pope, supra note 56, at 894-98.
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more inclusive sense of their own interests. 16 2 They may become
educated about the innumerable ways in which decisions in the
political sector affect working conditions-their own and those of
others-and they may come to see their interests as tied to the
63
1

welfare of others.

The restriction of section 7 protection to activity motivated by
economic self-interest rests on an impoverished understanding of
what work means to people: it denies that employees have a
genuine and legitimate interest in the broader implications of their
work. Yet the interests of employees are defined not just by the
terms of their relationship with the employer but also by the work
they do, the product they produce, the services they perform, and
the enterprise to which they belong. Indeed, employees' desire for
valuable and meaningful work becomes more salient to the extent
that their basic material needs-a decent wage, a tolerably safe
workplace, reasonable hours-are satisfied.1 64 Historically, then,
these "higher" needs have assumed greater importance to many
groups of workers since the 1930s, largely as a consequence of
economic gains made through economic growth, collective bargaining, and government regulation. 165 In that sense, the meaning of
work, and of a "good job," has changed since the Wagner Act was
passed.
The language of section 7 is generous enough in scope to
accommodate these increasingly prominent desires of employees.
When employees come to share broader concerns for quality and
public safety and social responsibility such that they are moved to
act in concert for the sake of those concerns, they engage in
"concerted activity for mutual aid or protection" within the meaning
162 See id. at 902-03. The comments of a union shop steward provide anecdotal
evidence of this development: "'Before the union came in, all I did was do my eight
hours, collect my paycheck, and go home .... I had no outside interests.... Since
I became active in the union, I've become active in politics, in the community, in
legislative problems.'" TERKEL, supra note 135, at 292 (quoting factory worker Grace
Clements).
163 This appears to have been operating in the UAW case, described supra text
accompanying notes 144-48.
164 See generally A.H. MAsLow, MOTIVATION AND PERSONALrrY 98-101 (1954)
(arguing that people have a hierarchy of needs, such that when "lower" physiological
and safety needs are met, "higher" needs for esteem and moral fulfillment emerge).
Maslow's concept of a hierarchy of needs was applied to the context of work in the
influential federal report referred to above. See WoRK IN AMERICA, supra note 139,
at 11-12.
165 See WEILER, supra note 8, at 35.
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of section 7, and should be protected from employer retaliation by
the Act.
B. The Interest of the Public in the Conduct of
PrivateEnterprise

An interesting counterpoint to section 7 is found, as discussed
above, in the public employee speech doctrine. This doctrine,
expressed most clearly in Connick v. Myers,1 66 is based on a particular view of the central meaning of the First Amendment-a view
that divides the sphere of constitutionally protected speech into a
core and a periphery. On that view, speech relevant to selfgovernment is at the heart of the First Amendment's protection of
freedom of speech; other speech, complaints about working
conditions and the like, is peripheral, and simply not important
enough to warrant the intrusion into governmental operations that
would necessarily attend broader First Amendment coverage of
public employees. 16 7 Moreover, Connick rests on.the belief that
speech on workplace matters is separable in a meaningful and
consistent way from speech on matters of public concern, and that
permitting suppression of the former will do no significant harm to
the latter.
As I have argued elsewhere, those critical propositions do not
stand up to scrutiny.168 Speech about important aspects of peoples' lives, including the workplace, cannot sensibly be distinguished
from speech on public issues. 169 People form political beliefs and
166 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
167 The Court in Connick conceded that the First Amendment protects more than
speech on matters of public concern. See id. at 147. It presumably would be
unconstitutional to arrest someone for complaining about their working conditions
even though that same person can now be fired for such speech. See id. The decision
in Connick is thus not based on the conclusion that the First Amendment simply
extends no further than the protection of speech on matters of public concern. I
have argued elsewhere, however, that Connick, together with Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.
v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 755-61 (1985), which adopts a public
concern test as a limit on First Amendment protections of libel defendants, may
foreshadow a widespread imposition of a "public concern" requirement in a variety

of areas of First Amendment doctrine. See Estlund, supra note 51, at 2.
168 See Estlund, supra note 51, at 37-39.
169 The distinction between the "private" sphere of labor relations and the
"public" sphere of politics is a recurring theme in scholarly critiques of the law
governing labor and employment relations. See Hyde, supra note 21, at 4; Karl E.
Klare, The Public/PrivateDistinction in Labor Law, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1358, 1361
(1982); Pope, supra note 56, at 896; Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Post-War
Paradigm in American LaborLaw, 90 YALE L.J. 1509, 1579-80 (1981).
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are moved to political and social action largely out of their own
experiences in the world, including those of the workplace. 170 It
may be a "personnel" matter-a sense of being exploited or
mistreated or harassed by one's bosses-that begins the public
1 71
employee's venture into the 'domain of public discourse.
Moreover, communication of these individual grievances among
fellow employees, like that which Sheila Myers was attempting, is
often a necessary step in the process of identifying shared concerns
and formulating collective demands. By eliminating protection for
work-related protests of this sort, the Connick public concern test
discounts the importance of speech grounded in the everyday
experience of ordinary people, in the workplace and elsewhere, and
deprives each public employee of the very legal protections she may
need in order to discover and join with those who share her
concerns, and thereby translate immediate self-interest into broader
172
demands on the polity.
The limitations on employee rights in Connick and in section 7
are two sides of the same coin. In seeking to banish workplace
concerns from the domain of free speech enjoyed by public
employees, Connick denies the continuity between concrete
grievances and the political demands that those grievances. may
generate. Section 7 doctrine reflects a contrary response to the
same blindspot: the insistence on narrow economic self-interest as
the key to section 7 protection impedes the emergence of a more
inclusive conception of self-interest-and of solidarity, political
activism, and genuine concerns about the quality, safety, and
integrity of the work product-out of more parochial workplace
interests. 173 Just as Connick discounts the role of the particular
170 For example, Professor Pope has recounted the development of vital
community movements, revolving around concerns for the environment and racial,
gender, and economicjustice, out of workplace conflicts. See Pope, supra note 56, at
891-94.
171 See supra text accompanying notes 44-46. Witness the saga of Professor Anita
Hill, whose allegations of sexual harassment at the hands of her former boss, nowJustice Clarence Thomas, carried her into the SenateJudiciary Committee hearings
and, via television, into the homes of most Americans. This episode is widely credited
with galvanizing public and legislative support for those provisions of the Civil Rights
Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991), that afford a damage remedy
to victims of sexual harassment, and with spurring Congress for the first time to make
its own members and staff accountable for claims of discrimination. SeeJudy Mann,
FeminisM, Alive and Well, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 1991, at D3. This episode dramatically
illustrates how public debate and even federal legislation can originate in the personal
grievances of a particular employee.
172 See Estlund, supra note 51, at 36-39.
173 See Pope, supra note 56, at 891-94, 921-22, 931, 936 (providing examples of
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grievance in generating "public concerns," section 7 doctrine is
sometimes blind to the ways in which "public," consumer-oriented,
or solidaristic concerns of employees emerge from and in turn
transform workplace experiences and interactions.
But Connick itself also contains the seeds of a different criticism
of the limitations on section 7 protection. Prominent in the
Supreme Court's pronouncements in this area is the interest of the
public in learning what the public employee knows about the
operations of government. 174 The public employee speech doctrine encourages disclosure of the sort of information that the
public employee is particularly-often uniquely-able to provide.
The protection of public employee speech, in this view, is not just
the vindication of the individual rights of public employees, but
serves a special function in promoting informed self-government.
The advent in Connick of the threshold public concern requirement represents a notable turn toward the latter, systemic rationale
for protecting public employee speech. 175
First Amendment
protections of public employee speech are now limited to public
issues not because the employee has no right to speak on other
matters, 176 but because it is only those matters that the broader
public is thought to have a special interest in hearing about. Under
Connick public employee speech has come to be viewed as the
handmaiden of democracy rather than as the exercise of an
individual right guaranteed by the Constitution.
This development in First Amendment law is ill-advised, I
believe, in part because it ensures that much speech of genuine
public concern will be silenced, if it does not simply remain
unspoken. 177 But what the public concern test does protect is

this development).
174 See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145-46 (1983); id. at 161-62 (Brennan,
J., dissenting); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 228 (1974) (MarshallJ., dissenting);
Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 571-72 (1968).
175 The Court's explanation for the public concern requirement relies heavily on
the importance of speech on public issues to an informed citizenry and to selfgovernment. Connick, 461 U.S. at 145-46; cf. Lieberwitz, supra note 7, at 636-38, 65051 (noting that Connick stresses the instrumental value of speech for society, not its
intrinsic value to the individual).
176 See supra note 167.

177 See Estlund, supranote 51, at 32-51. See generally Massaro, supra note 7, at 4-5
(arguing that the Supreme Court's approach to public employee speech fails to

provide adequate protection for the employee's interest in free expression). By
denying public employees constitutional protection for criticism of their employer

when their own interests are directly implicated, the public concern test contemplates
that much information that would be useful to the public will never be brought to
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clearly worthy of protection. The public does indeed have a strong
interest in learning about the honesty or corruption of public
officials, abuses of power or mistreatment of wards of the state, the
environmental consequences of government actions, and shortcomings in the service provided by a government agency. The public
concern test, while problematic in many ways, thus affirms the
special role that public employees often play in bringing to light
information on such issues and enhancing the accountability of
public officials to the people.
The same public interest is implicated by the speech of private
sector employees, for much of what is left unprotected by section 7
as insufficiently related to terms and conditions of employment is
the very sort of speech that the public has the strongest interest in
hearing. The quality of medical services, the safety of a nuclear
power facility or a commercial airline, the care received by residents
of a private drug treatment center or nursing home, the environmental practices of private firms, even the quality of television
service provided by one of a small number of publicly licensed
broadcasters in the area-these are all matters of self-evident public
concern under any but the narrowest understanding of the
term. 17 8 Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized a strong
enough public interest even in mundane commercial information,
such as the prices and quality of commercial goods, to justify the
substantial constitutional protections extended to commercial
advertising in the last fifteen years. According to the Court, "the
free flow of commercial information is indispensable ...

to the

formation of intelligent opinions as to how [the free enterprise]
17 9
system ought to be regulated or altered."
There is no need here to enter into the debate within First
Amendment jurisprudence as to the meaning and relative importance of "political" and other kinds of speech in our constitutional
light. The working conditions of public employees-in Sheila Myers' case, low morale
and mistrust within an important government office-are very often immediately
relevant to the agency's effective performance of its functions. Yet it is inevitable that
those most motivated and likely to bring these problems to light will often be those
who have been personally aggrieved in some way.
178 See ATLESON, supra note 40, at 85 (noting the obvious community interest in
the speech at issue inJefferson Standard);Klare, supra note 169, at 1364 (asserting that
"[t]he quality of a public licensee's service is, of course, a matter" of public concern).
179 Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 765 (1976). The Court went so far as to declare that the "consumer's
interest in the free flow of commercial information... maybe as keen, if not keener
by far, than his interest in the day's most urgent political debate." Id. at 763.
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scheme.1 80 I am not arguing that the First Amendment itself
protects the speech of private-sector employees against retaliatory
discharge, or requires that section 7 be interpreted to afford such
protection.1 81 I contend simply that the public has an interest in
hearing what the private-sector employee has to say about the
conduct of his or her employer outside the immediate realm of
personnel and labor relations matters. This public interest is
recognized in First Amendment decisions; it is also driving the
growth of one branch of state wrongful discharge law-the "public
182
policy" exception to the presumption of "at-will" employment.
Extending section 7 protection to concerted employee speech on
issues of concern to consumers and the broader public would serve
the public interest in receiving this information as well.
I hasten to acknowledge that the NLRA was not enacted to
promote the public interest in learning about how private employers
conduct themselves outside the labor relations context. No such
interest is explicitly protected by the statute, nor does this policy
consideration figure as such in the legislative history of the Act. But
this concession is hardly fatal. As I have argued at length, much of
the speech that would usefully inform the public also is linkedalbeit in ways not traditionally recognized-to the interests of
employees as employees, and to their working experience. Those
employee interests are sufficient to justify the expansion of
section 7 rights proposed here. The public interest in receiving
information critical of private employers is proffered here as an
additional reason for favoring an otherwise reasonable interpretation of the scope of section 7.
For those with a more adventurous view of statutory interpretation, however, I would go one step further; for a strong case can be
made that the statute invites the application of quasi-constitutional
considerations such as these in its interpretation. The rights
recognized in section 7 were characterized by Senator Wagner and
the Act's supporters as "elemental," as somehow more basic than,
even prior to, any statutory enactment.18 3 The Supreme Court
180 For a schematic review of varying attempts to define the scope of the First
Amendment, and particularly of "political" or "public issue" speech, see Estlund, supra
note 51, at 44-46.
181 Others have challenged the coherence of the state action barriers to such
claims. See Lieberwitz, supra note 7, at 629 n.208 (collecting sources).
182 As I discuss below, however, that body of law affords only fragmentary
protection even to the few who can afford to invoke it. See infra text accompanying
notes 254-256.

183 See, e.g., 79 CONG. REC. 7565 (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE
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echoed this view in upholding the Act: the Court described the
rights of collective protest and association at the heart of section 7
as "fundamental," 18 4 suggesting that those rights existed prior to
and independent of the Wagner Act's explicit recognition and
enforcement of them. And indeed, in one sense those rights clearly
did predate the Wagner Act, for they are grounded in basic
freedoms protected by the Constitution. Congress repeatedly
invoked constitutional values of freedom and democratic self1 85
determination in support of the statute.
What significance does this have in the interpretation of
section 7? Professor Clyde Summers has argued persuasively that
the enactment of the NLRA represents a paradigmatic instance of
HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 1935 [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF NLRA] at 2321-22 (statement of Sen. Wagner: describing bill as "the
next step in the logical unfolding of man's eternal quest for freedom," the
"cornerstone of industrial liberty"); 79 Cong. Rec. 9691, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF NLRA at 3132 (statement of Rep. Withrow: this bill guarantees to labor
"[t]he right of self-government through fairly chosen representatives[-]a right which

is inherent to the American people"); LaborDisputesAc Hearingson H.R. 6288 Before
the House Comm. on Labor, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 247 (1935), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF NLRA at 2721 (statement of Frank Dillon: "Congress must preserve for
the working people of the United States theirfundamental and basic rights"); To Create
a NationalLaborBoard: Hearingson S.-2926 Before Comm, on Educationand Labor,73rd
Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1934) [hereinafter "1934 SenateHearings"),reprintedin LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF NLRA at 49 (statement of Hon. Frances Perkins, Sec. of Labor: "the
right of workers to organize and deal collectively with their employers existed befroe

section 7(a) of the National Recovery Act" (the predecessor to § 7, see supra text
accompanying notes 113-16)); 1934 Senate Hearings at 115, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF NLRA at at 145 (statement of Dr. Francis Haas, member of National
Labor Board: § 7 of NIRA, see supra text accompanying notes 113-16, "dedare[s] that
[workers] may exercise rights which nature gives them"), 1934 Senate Hearingsat 136,
reprintedin LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF NLRA at 166 (statement ofJacob Panken: this
bill is "protective of the rights of Americans to organize themselves and to give
expression to their opinions without interference, intimidation, or coercion...");
1934 Senate Hearings at 190, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF NLRA at 220
(statement of Dr. John Lapp: workers' "right to act in unison... is an elemental
right of man"); NationalLabor Relations Board: Hearings on S. 1958 Before the Senate
Comm. on Education and Labor, 74th Cong. 1st Sess. 310 (1935) [hereinafter "1935
Senate Hearings"], reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF NLRA at 1696 (statement of
Gordon Merritt in opposition to bill: affirming"the natural right and natural freedom
of employees to organize"); 1935 Senate Hearingsat 871,885, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF NLRA at 2257, 2271 (statement of William Leiserson, Chairman,
National Mediation Board: referring to "the constitutional rights of employees to
associate themselves").
184 See NLRB v.Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1937).
185 Seesupranote 183. This aspect of the legislative history of the Wagner Act has
been reviewed by several scholars. See Gorman & Finkin, supra note 110, at 339-44;
Lynd, supra note 10, at 713-15; Summers, supra note 10, at 697-98.
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Congress stepping across the "state action" threshold and expanding
the reach of constitutional freedoms into the sphere of private
relations.1 8 6 Congress sought to protect employees' exercise of
basic rights of free expression and association against employer
retaliation as well as against state suppression.1 87
Professor
Summers has argued further that "when Congress acts to protect or
promote constitutional values, the courts and administrative
agencies in interpreting and applying the statute should weigh those
18 8
values in constitutional terms."
When Congress acted to protect employees' rights to join
together and to protest matters of shared concern, and to appeal to
the public for support on such matters, it acted to effectuate values
of constitutional dimension, albeit beyond the arena of state action.
When we "weigh those values in constitutional terms," we may fairly
consider not only the interest of employees in speaking out on
matters of concern to them, but also the public interest in hearing
what the private-sector employee has to say, and not only about the
traditional economic demands of labor but equally about such
matters as the quality and safety of the product or environmental
practices.
Connick highlights the paramount importance in a
democratic society of speech on matters of public concern, and
recognizes the special role that employees can play in bringing such
matters to light. That public interest, consonant as it is with the
interests of employees at the core of the Act, is worthy of consideration in the private sector as well, and supports the expansion of
section 7 rights called for here.
This may seem to be an unorthodox and controversial approach
to statutory interpretation,1 8 9 and my conclusions about section
See Summers, supra note 10, at 701.
187 In Professor Summers' words:
186

[T]he core of labor law is protection and promotion of constitutional values.
Freedom of association and the closely-linked freedom of expression are
protected against employer restraints because such freedoms are preconditions to the declared national policy of encouraging collective bargaining,
and collective bargaining is to be encouraged because it promotes the
constitutional values of democratic decision-making and due process at the
workplace.
Id.
" Id. at 702. In other words, "[w]hen Congress has acted to protect personal
freedoms from private controls or to promote democratic processes in private
institutions, then the presumption should be that those values are to have predominate weight." Id.
189 Professor Eskridge demonstrates, however, that "[flor an old, generally worded
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7 do not strictly depend on it. The public interest in the freer flow
of information about important private economic actors has the
virtue of being in harmony with the interest of employees in
speaking freely about matters of concern to them at the workplace,
an interest that is explicit and paramount in the NLRA.

M.

EXPANDING THE SCOPE OF PROTECTED PROTEST UNDER
SECTION 7: A PROPOSAL AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

For the reasons just discussed, section 7 should be construed to
recognize the interests of employees not only in their terms and
conditions of employment but also in the effect of the employer's
operations on consumers, patients and other outside third parties.
To that end I here propose a redefinition of the scope of "mutual
aid or protection," the thrust of which is to leave the determination
of the appropriate subjects of employee concerns largely in the
hands of employees themselves. Within a very broad arena of
potential subjects of employee concern, the simple fact of concerted
activity among employees should be sufficient to trigger section 7
protection. As I have noted, the apparently dramatic consequences
of this expansion of section 7 coverage are sharply limited by other
restrictions on section 7 rights under existing law as well as by
certain practical constraints on-employee protest.
A. The ProposedDefinition: Expanding the Range of
Recognized Employee Interests
I have offered two sorts of reasons for expanding the scope of
section 7, one focusing on the interest of employees in speaking
out, the other on the interest of the public in hearing what these
employees have to say. Both arguments indicate the need for an
statute that has been the subject of much litigation, the original legislative expectations actually carry very little weight in the interpretive process, whatever rhetoric the
Court uses to justify its result." Eskridge, supra note 103, at 1539-40. And indeed,
traditional canons of statutory interpretation support the consideration of public
policy in choosing among broader or narrower interpretations of a statute. See
NoRMANJ. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 56.01-56.04 (4th ed.

1984). All three of the traditional sources of public policy-statutes, the Constitution,
and the common law-provide reasons for adopting a broader reading of § 7. The
statutory policy of the Act and of other statutes governing employment is discussed
supra notes 107-24 and accompanying text; constitutional policy is also described
above, see supra notes 183-88 and accompanying text; the common law policies
articulated in the evolving law of wrongful discharge are treated below, see infra text
accompanying notes 272-75.
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extension of section 7 protection to include protests that touch on
employees' role as producers of goods and services, and as participants in enterprises that have an impact on the outside world.
Section 7 should thus be expanded to presumptively protect any
concerted communication or protest by employees about the
conduct of the employer as it affects the public. As under existing
section 7 doctrine, this proposal would not identify particular kinds
of company decisions as either exposed to or shielded from
employee protest; instead, the crucial factor would be the nature of
the employees' appeal.
On this reading of section 7, the nurses, nuclear plant construction workers, and drug counsellors discussed above, and even the
Jefferson Standard technicians, would all presumptively be protected
in their criticism of the product or service they participated in
bringing to the public. Closely analogous, and similarly protected,
would be speech about consequences of the employer's production
process, such as environmental hazards. Employees who come to
have such concerns, and to share them with fellow employees, are
seeking to advance their interests "as employees" and are thus
engaged in activity for "mutual aid or protection." Employees have
a legitimate stake in being part of an enterprise that does good and
1 90
not harm in the society.
On the other hand, the proposed definition would deny
protection to employees engaged in purely internal disputes over
management decisionmaking within the company without regard to
their effects on either terms and conditions of employment or the
interests of consumers or the public. Thus, employees who become
enmeshed in intra-management disputes about the allocation of
authority within an organization, management philosophy, or
fundamentally personal rivalries or conflicts would not generally be
protected. Similarly, employee agitation on behalf of shareholders
alone would remain beyond the scope of section 7. After all, such

190 A close question would arise as to the status of concerted employee protest of
the employer's use of its financial resources for ends opposed by the employees, for
example, investments in South Africa or right-wing political contributions. On the
one hand, this might seem to stretch beyond recognition the concept of employees'
interests "as employees." Such protests would not involve the employees' work
product or the productive process in which they participate. On the other hand such
protests would involve the impact of the enterprise on the society at large. While I
acknowledge it is a close call, I would hold that in the unusual case in which such
topics become the subject of concerted activity among employees, that activity should
be presumptively protected, subject to the ubiquitous restrictions on time, place and
manner that I discuss below. See infra text accompanying notes 214-33.
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cases would typically involve employees who, purporting to assert
the interests of the firm's owners, are fired by those already
appointed to safeguard those interests, namely, management. When
employees involve themselves in a purely internal dispute of this
nature and manifest no concern for themselves as employees or for
others outside the firm, there is simply no occasion for public
intervention under section 7.
One central implication of the definition proffered above is that
the scope of protected political activity by employees at the
workplace, as well as the permissible scope of solidaristic activity on
behalf of other employees, would be expanded. 19 1 Once we
recognize that employees have a legitimate stake in aspects of their
employer's conduct that go well beyond its labor policies and
practices, it follows that section 7 must protect a much broader
range of "political" speech. Thus, for example, section 7 would
protect employees who speak out in favor of regulation aimed at the
product or services provided by their employer, or of environmental
policies that would affect the employer; by the same token, it would
protect employee activity directed against such government action.
Of course, not all "political" speech by employees can reasonably be
characterized as activity "for mutual aid or protection" even under
my expanded definition. For example, employees handing out
"right-to-life" pamphlets or literature opposing military assistance
to El Salvador would not generally come within this definition of
"mutual aid or protection" under section 7.192 These issues do
not affect any aspect of the employer's conduct, in labor relations
193
or otherwise.
191 Professors Fischl and Hyde have each argued effectively, albeit in different
ways, for an expansion of § 7 coverage to protect a broader range of politicalactivity
by employees. Professor Fischl demonstrates that concerted activity not grounded in
"self-interest" but motivated by support for the interests of other employees should
itself be protected by § 7. See Fischl, supra note 21, at 842-58. Professor Hyde notes
the vast and growing significance of public regulation for conditions of private
employment, and primarily on that basis argues for broader protection of political
means of seeking improvements in conditions of employment. See Hyde, supra note
21, at 13-19. I agree with both of them, but my concern is somewhat different. I am
seeking to broaden the definition of what interests employees have so as to gain § 7
protection for conventional as well as "political activity" on their own behalf, and for
solidaristic activity on their behalf by other employees.
192 Nor, it seems, would the employees in the Eagle Electhic or Tektronix cases
discussed supra note 83.
19' Surely an argument might be proffered, based upon some comprehensive
ideological or religious world view, that employers are affected and that employees'
interests as employees are deeply implicated by these issues (and by almost any issues
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One can surely imagine some protests that come within the
proposed definition but that seem so remote from the interests of
employees that the statute cannot reasonably be construed to
protect them. Such an exercise in imagination should not distract
from the reality that concerted activity is unlikely in the absence of
some shared sense of concern among employees.1 94 As I will
explain below, the requirement of "concerted activity" operates both
as an acceptable limit on the consequences of expanded subjectmatter coverage and as concrete evidence of the existence of
employee concern over a subject. The fact of concerted activity,
and not an artificially restricted conception of the appropriate
concerns of employees, should be the fulcrum of section 7 analysis.
B. "Concerted Activity" as an Alternative Gauge of
Employee Concerns
The redefinition of section 7 proposed here is driven by a
simple idea: by directing their energies toward a particular area of
concern, employees themselves define their own interests and thus
the proper objects of "mutual aid or protection." The presence of
concerted activity, an independent requirement for section 7
protection under current doctrine, thus serves to indicate the
existence of genuine employee concern over an issue.
The prevailing interpretation of the "concert" requirement is
quite literal. 195 In most cases it is fulfilled if and only if some

of importance to the speaker). But the argument would sound implausible and
contrived to all but the converted, and would almost invariably depend on post hoc
rationalizations about speech that on its face makes no reference to the employer or
to the shared interests or experiences of employees. Nor could political speech of
this sort be brought within the scope of § 7 by including a request that the employer
support such a cause. In contrast, in the case of employee protest of employer's
political activity and contributions, the employer has opened itself up to a broader
range of employee protest by expanding its own activities into the political sphere.
194This may not be true of tactical product criticism of the sort illustrated in
Jefferson Standard. For my contentions in support of protecting this kind of criticism,
see infra text accompanying notes 234-45.
195 See Meyers Industries, Inc. (Meyers II), 281 N.L.R.B. 882 (1986), enforced sub
nom. Prill v. NLRB, 835 F.2d 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1987). A fuller elaboration of the
reasoning behind the Board's approach to the concert requirement may be found in
the Board's original decision in this case, Meyers Industries, Inc. (Meyers I), 268
N.L.R.B. 493 (1984), remandedsub nom. Prill v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 948 (1985). After the court of appeals remanded Meyers I for Board
reconsideration in light of the Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. City Disposal
Systems, 465 U.S. 822 (1984), see infra note 197, the Board reaffirmed its earlier
decision but underscored its willingness to recognize various ways in which individual
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activity is undertaken by two or more employees together. 196 The
activity of a single individual will be deemed "concerted" if it is
undertaken after consultation with and at the behest of others, or
with the object of inducing or preparing for group action, or
pursuant to rights contained in a collective bargaining agreement. 197 One employee's solitary complaint about her own
working conditions will not generally be protected. 198 Nor, under
my proposal, would an individual's complaint about product safety
be protected unless it was undertaken as part of, or with an eye
toward, joint action with other employees.
In embracing the existing contours of the "concert" requirement, this proposal runs against the current of recent commentary.
Some observers, most notably Professors Robert Gorman and
Matthew Finkin, have called for virtual elimination of the requirement. 199 They acknowledge that a literal reading of section 7
suggests that individual action is not generally protected unless
undertaken in "concert" with other employees, but nonetheless
argue that Congress did not intend such a limitation. 20 0 They
activity might be linked to group activity so as to come within § 7. See Meyers II, 281
N.L.R.B. at 885-87.
196 See Meyers I, 268 N.L.R.B at 493-94.
197 See City DisposalSystems, 465 U:S. at 831; Meyers II, 281 N.L.R.B. at 885-87. In
City Disposalthe Supreme Court upheld the Board's Interborodoctrine, see Interboro
Contractors, Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 1295, 1298 (1966), enforced, 388 F.2d 495 (2d. Cir.
1967), which held that individual assertion of a right contained in a collective
bargaining agreement constituted "concerted activity" within the meaning of § 7
because of the act's close tie to the collective activity that led to the agreement. See
City Disposal, 465 U.S. at 831-32, 841.
198
See Meyers I, 268 N.L.R.B. at 494; see e.g., Capitol Ornamental Concrete
Specialties, Inc., 248 N.L.R.B. 851 (1980) (holding that purely personal "griping" is
not protected).
19 See Gorman & Finkin, supra note 110, at 329; see also B. Glenn George, Divided
We Stand: Concerted Activity and the Maturingof the NLRA, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
509, 511 (1988) (calling for the elimination of the concert requirement); Staughton
Lynd, Communal Rights, 62 TEX. L. REv. 1417, 1426-30 (1984) (to the same effect); cf.
Terry A. Bethel, Constructive ConcertedActivity Underthe NLRA: ConflictingSignalsfrom
the Court and the Board, 59 IND. L.J. 583, 606-13 (1984) (advocating more flexible
concept
of concerted action).
200
See Gorman & Finkin, supra note 110, at 299. Professors Gorman and Finkin
point out that Congress borrowed the phrase "concerted activities for mutual aid or
protection" from § 2 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70, 70 (1932)
(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1988)), which sharply restricted the federal courts'
injunctive powers in labor disputes. See Gorman & Finkin, supra note 110, at 331.
They argue that the insertion of the term "concerted" in that statute was designed not
to single out group activity for exclusive protection, but rather to underscore
Congress's rejection of decades of antilabor jurisprudence that had done the
opposite: singled out concerted employee action for judicial condemnation. See id.
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further contend that this literal reading, by leaving unprotected
individual efforts to improve working conditions for all, yields
anomalous results that are inconsistent with the basic policies of the
Act. 20 ' Professors Gorman and Finkin would essentially collapse
the "concert" requirement into the requirement of "mutual aid or
protection": where an individual's activity is directed to improving
working conditions-that is, where its objective meets the existing

definition of "mutual aid or protection"-it would be protected
under section 7 whether undertaken by a lone individual or a
20 2

group.
The proposals for eliminating the "concert" requirement
approve and extend the Board's now-abandoned doctrine of
"constructive concerted activity."2° 3
Under that approach to
section 7, which culminated in the Board's decision in Alleluia
Cushion Co., 20 4 the Board protected the activity of a solitary
employee who addressed "matters of great and continuing concern
for all within the work force,"20 5 such as job safety. This approach to section 7-what Professor Fischl calls the "conflationist
strategy" of Alleluia Cushion20 6-was almost universally rejected by
the courts of appeals, based largely on the literalist objection that
20 7
it renders part of section 7's sparse language redundant.

at 331-37. From the early labor conspiracy cases through the antitrust attack on labor
under the Sherman and Clayton Acts, courts had condemned employee actions taken
in "combination" that would be admittedly immune from legal attack if taken
individually, such as quitting employment or refusing to purchase nonunion goods.
Professors Gorman and Finkin are very persuasive in their argument that the
congressional sanctioning of "concerted activities for mutual aid or protection" in the
context of the Norris-LaGuardia Act was based on the understanding that individual
action was already largely immune from injunction. See id. at 336.
The argument loses some force however, when applied to § 7 of the NLRA. See
Bethel, supra note 199, at 600-02. In the context of employer action against dissenting
workers, toward which § 7 is primarily directed, there is no similar history of special
legal immunity for individual action. Prior to the enactment of the Wagner Act in
1935, employers were free to discharge an employee for any reason at all, including
individual or group protest of working conditions. Id. Congress might well have
imported the term without reflecting on its altered significance in this new context.
See supra text accompanying notes 110-16. But Congress could not have proceeded
on the understanding that individual protest was already protected from employer
retaliation (as they could have with respect tojudicial suppression). See Bethel, supra
note 199, at 600-02.
201 See Gorman & Finkin, supra note 110, at 329.
202 See id. at 344-45.
203 See id. at 299, 308.

204 221 N.L.R.B. 999 (1975).
215 Id. at 1000.
206 Fischl, supra note 21, at 828.

207 See Fischl, supra note 21, at 828-29; Gorman & Finkin, supra note 110, at 315-
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Ultimately accepting this criticism, the Board overturned Alleluia
20 8
Cushion.
The literal language of section 7 presents a serious hurdle,
though not an insurmountable one, to any attempt to eliminate the
"concert" requirement. 2 9 In my view, however, the more serious
objection to Alleluia Cushion or to any similar attempt to eliminate
the "concert" requirement is that it rests upon an externally
imposed definition of the interests of employees. Under Alleluia
Cushion, section 7 protection turned entirely upon whether the
Board found that the employee's objective was a matter of "great
and continuing concern for all within the work force."2 10 As the
Board explained in Meyers I:
The practical effect of [Alleluia Cushion] was to transform concerted activity into a mirror image of itself. Instead of looking at the
observable evidence of group action to see what men and women
...

in fact chose as an issue about which to take some action, it

was the Board that determined the existence of an issue about
which employees ought to have a group concern. 211
I concur with the Board's prevailing view: Collective action among
workers is distinctive; it is generally the best evidence we have of
what employees actually care about in the workplace.
But the Board's acknowledgment that joint action is the best
evidence of shared concern undermines its current limitations on
the scope of employee interests under section 7. In the interests of
promoting employees' own vision of what matters to them at work,
employee activity that is concerted in nature should be presumed to
be for "mutual aid or protection." 212 We should, in the Board's
words, "look[] at the observable evidence of group action to see
what men and women in the workplace in fact chose as an issue
about which to take some action," 213 but we should do so not only
to deny protection in the absence of joint action but also to grant
protection where employees, by engaging in joint action, have
expressed their shared concern about non-traditional issues.
28.

208 See Meyers Indus., Inc. (Meyers I), 268 N.L.R.B. 493 (1984).
209 See supra note 200.
210

Alleluia Cushion Co., 221 N.L.R.B. at 1000.

211 Meyers I, 268 N.L.R.B. at 495.

212 Such presumption shouldbe subject only to the qualifications discussedin the
foregoing
section. See supra text accompanying notes 190-94.
21
Meyers 1, 268 N.L.R.B. at 495.
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The proposed approach to section 7 would minimize the role of
the Board and the courts in assessing the appropriateness of the
employee's aims and concerns, and focus their attention instead on
whether the employees themselves defined their concerns as the
appropriate focus of joint activity. Protection would thus turn on
fairly objective (if sometimes admittedly fortuitous) circumstances
rather than on highly contestable, policy-laden views about the
proper interests of employees.
The employees who fail to surmount the existing concert
requirement-individuals fired for refusing to drive an unsafe
vehicle, or for protesting onerous working conditions affecting allare sympathetic complainants. Their actions may indeed represent
the early manifestations of employee dissent and thus the roots of
concerted activity. The section 7 requirement that activity be
concerted in nature is not without its costs. But in my view the cost
would be justified, even if not strictly compelled by the language of
the Act, if it were to permit us to place in the hands of employees
themselves the choice of which issues and concerns are truly
important in the pursuit of "mutual aid or protection."
C. Other Legal and PracticalLimits on the Consequences of the
ProposedExpansion of Section 7 Rights

One might imagine that recognizing the presumptive legitimacy
of employee protest about many aspects of the employer's business
would subject employers to a rash of damaging public disclosures on
all aspects of their operations, or even to strikes and picketing
aimed at forcing the employer to alter its policies. Whether this
would be a desirable or an undesirable consequence, it is a highly
unlikely one. Even apart from the development of specific
exceptions for certain kinds of public criticism or disclosure, various
aspects of existing law greatly restrict the likely consequences of
broadening section 7 rights as proposed here.
Section 7 protects concerted activity for mutual aid or protection; but it does not protect all such activity. 214 First, section 7
protects only those who are defined as "employees" under the Act;
supervisory, "confidential," and managerial employees do not come
214 Indeed, as Karl Kare has pointed out, "[i]t is extraordinary how much of the
law ... pertains to ways in which employees may lose rather than gain § 7 rights."
Klare, supra note 169, at 1403 n.196; see also id. at 1403-05; ATLESON, supra note 40,
at 44-66.
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within this definition. 2 15 Thus, many of those employees whose
dissent would be viewed most anxiously by employers have no rights
under section 7.
Moreover, section 7 rights are subject to restrictions on the time
and place of their exercise-activity occurring in work areas and
during work hours may be curtailed by the employer 2 16 -as

well

as on their manner. 217 Of particular importance in the present
context is the withdrawal of protection for speech that is knowingly
or recklessly false and defamatory. 2 18 'Product disparagement,"
revelation of environmental crimes or the like would not be
protected if it was false and the employees acted with knowledge or
219
reckless disregard of its falsity.
215 See 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1988) (supervisory exclusion); NLRB v. Hendricks
County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 454 U.S. 170, 180-81 (1981) (affirming the
Board's limitation of "confidential" to include only those who "'act in a confidential
capacity to persons who exercise "managerial" functions in the field of labor
relations'" (quoting Ford Motor Co., 66 N.L.R.B. 1317, 1322 (1946))); NLRB v. Bell
Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974) (managerial exclusion). Also, the Act protects
only "employees" of those who qualify as "employers" within the meaning of the Act,
29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1988). See supra note 9.
216 See Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 797-98 (1945) (holding
that employees had a § 7 right to solicit union supportat the workplace subject to the
employer's power to restrict such activity to non-working areas and non-working
times).
217 For example, physical violence or threats, sabotage, and prolonged physical
occupation of the employer's property are unlawful under laws of general application
and are unprotected under long-established interpretations of§ 7. See, e.g., NLRB v.
Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 256 (1939) (holding that a prolonged
sitdown strike involving the destruction of machinery was unprotected); NLRB v.
Thayer Co., 213 F.2d 748, 755-56 (1st Cir. 1954) (holding that picketing that restrains
or coerces other employees in the exercise of their § 7 rights is unprotected),seealso
infra text accompanying notes 278-81. Other forms of concerted activity that are not
otherwise unlawful, such as slowdowns, have long been held unprotected. See Elk
Lumber Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 333, 336 (1950). Numerous scholars have criticized the
exclusion of slowdowns and partial strikes from the scope of§ 7. See, e.g., ATLESON,
supra note 40, at 50-66 (rebutting common arguments in favor of the unprotected
status of slowdowns and partial strikes); Julius G. Getman, The Protected Status of
Partial Strikes After Lodge 76: A Comment, 29 STAN. L. REv. 205, 206 (1977)
(concluding that the unprotected status of partial strikes is "inconsistent with the
trend of decisions construing sections 7 and 8" (footnotes omitted)). Indeed, the
unprotected status of these activities is arguably open to question after more recent
decisions. See Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Emp. Rel. Comm'n.,
427 U.S. 132 (1976); NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
See generally Getman, supra, at 207 (stating that the Court's decision in Insurance
Agents "undermined the reasoning on which Briggs & Stratton rested").
218 See Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 63 (1966)
(emphasizing that "malicious libel enjoys no constitutional protection in any context").
?19 Indeed, in those cases the speech would be actionable under state defamation
law. See id. at 59-63.
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Concerted activity that takes the form of economic pressure-

especially strikes and picketing-is further limited by collective
bargaining obligations, both contractual and statutory. Most work
stoppages during the term of a collective bargaining agreement
violate the ubiquitous no-strike clause and, under well-established
case law, are therefore unprotected by section 7.220 The duty to
bargain in good faith under the Act has been interpreted as placing
further limitations on the scope of section 7 rights, and thus on the
consequences of expanding those rights. That duty extends by
statute only to "terms and conditions of employment," 22 1 and has
been further limited by judicial decision to the sphere of "mandatory topics of bargaining." 222 This has important consequences for
the scope of section 7 rights, for the duty to bargain in good faith
over mandatory topics has been held to imply the corollary duty not
to engage in "economic pressure" such as strikes or boycotts in
support of nonmandatory or "permissive" topics, at least in the
context of collective bargaining over mandatory topics. 223 Thus,
employees' use of economic pressure to gain concessions from the
employer in collective bargaining would remain largely limited, even
under my proposed broader reading of section 7, to "terms and
conditions of employment" as that term has been construed over
the years.

224

220 See NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332, 344 (1939) (holding that activities

in breach of contract are unprotected under § 7).
221 NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988).
222 See NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
22 See id. Under Borg-Warner,a union commits an unfair labor practice under
§ 8(b)(3) of the Act, and employees engage in unprotected activity under § 7, by
conditioning their agreement on mandatory issues upon the employers' concessions
on nonmandatory issues. Borg-Warner is frequently read more broadly to prohibit,
and to deny § 7 protection to economic pressure in support of nonmandatory
demands under any circumstances. See Cox ET AL., supra note 12, at 547; ROBERT A.
GORMAN, LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 303 (1976). But
that broader proposition is not supported by its supposed rationale-that such
conduct constitutes a refusal to bargain on mandatory topics. See Theodore J. St.
Antoine, Legal Barriersto Worker Participationin ManagementDecisionMaking, 58 TUL.
L. REV. 1301, 1305-07 (1984); cf. Pope,supra note 56, at 957 (questioning this broader
reading of Borg-Warner). Simply because the Act does not legally compel the
employer to bargain over such matters does not lead to the conclusion that employees
may not bring economic pressure on the employer to do so. Thus, a work stoppage
aimed at pressuring the employer to reverse a partial shutdown decision, a
nonmandatory topic under First Nat'l Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981), or
a work stoppage to improve product quality, valid under the proposal, should be
protected under § 7 unless it effectively precludes bargaining on other "mandatory"
issues.
224 Of course, limitations on the duty to bargain, like the limits on § 7 rights, rest

1992]

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION UNDER THE NLRA

Without approving all these limits on employee rights, 2 25 one
must acknowledge their existence, for they greatly restrict the
consequences of the proposed change. Still, I do not wish to
understate those consequences. A broader definition of the
interests of employees under section 7 would expose the employer
to some disruptive tactics-work stoppages and the like-with respect
to a far broader range of topics than before. The strike is presumptively a protected form of protest under section 7 absent particular
2 26
circumstances such as those noted above.
But the consequences of broadening protection are further
limited by the lawful countermeasures available to employers.
Under current law employees engaged in a lawful, protected strike
may be "permanently replaced," though not fired, without any
showing of economic necessity. 227 Partly as a consequence of this
much-criticized quirk of American labor law, 228 as well as unfavoron a narrow conception of the legitimate interests of employees, and a broad
conception of the scope of managerial prerogatives entitled to recognition under the
Act, both of which I challenge here. See supra notes 125-65 and accompanying text;
infra notes 284-302 and accompanying text. Acceptance of the arguments advanced
here for expanding the employee interests protected by § 7 would deeply erode the
conceptual foundations of the limits on the mandatory duty to bargain. Still, the duty
to bargain is defined by a different and narrower statutory provision, and raises
practical and legal considerations that go beyond those considered here.
225 See supra note 217.
226 See NLRA § 13, 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1988) ("Nothing in this Act, except as
specifically provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or
impede or diminish in any way the right to strike ... ."); NLRB v. Washington
Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962). Various circumstances can render a strike
unprotected-an unlawful objective, an attempt to force employer concessions on
permissive topics of bargaining, or a breach of a contractual no-strike promise-but
strikes in support of interests recognized by § 7 are presumptively protected.
227 See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938).
Employees striking in response to employer unfair labor practices may not be
permanently replaced. See Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956).
Despite contemporary criticism, see infra notes 228-29 and accompanying text, the
Mackay rule, permitting permanent replacement of economic strikers, was reaffirmed
and extended in Trans World Airlines v. Independent Fed. of Flight Attendants, 489
U.S. 426 (1989).
228 Most industrial democracies forbid the hiring of permanent replacements for
strikers. See Matthew W. Finkin, LaborPolicy and the Enervation of the Economic Strike,
1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 547,569. Criticism of Mackay, on grounds of both its conceptual
inconsistency with and its practical impact on the statutory right to strike, has been
a recurrent theme in labor law scholarship with which I happily associate myself. See
ATLESON, supra note 40, at 19-34; WEILER, supra note 8, at 265-69; Leonard B.
Boudin, Rights of Strikers, 35 U. ILL. L. REV. 817, 830 (1940); Finkin, supra,at 567-74;
Getman, supra note 20, at 1203-05; Klare, supra note 169, at 301-03; George Schatzki,
Some ObservationsandSuggestions Concerninga Misnomer-'Protected" Concerted Activities,
47 TEx. L. REV. 378, 382-95 (1969); Paul Weiler, StrikingA New Balance: Freedom of
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able economic conditions and a variety of nonlegal constraints, the
strike is at risk of becoming a virtual anachronism in modern labor
relations. 229 The notion that employees, once freed to protest
patient conditions and product quality, will launch a rash of strikes
over such matters is simply fanciful.
This raises a more general observation about the consequences
of broadening the scope of the issues as to which section 7 offers
protection: those consequences will be most drastically limited not
by what the law allows workers to do but by what workers realistically will choose to do. First, as I have shown above, employees tend
to share with their employers a strong interest-psychological as well
as economic-in public and consumer approval of the employer and
its product or service. Moreover, employees who go so far as to
contemplate public criticism or other protest directed at their
employer do not face a cost-free choice. The employer faced with
what it regards as hostile worker activity retains the power, even if
not the legal right, to fire the employee. That is, of course,
precisely what the statute prohibits, but long experience under the
NLRA teaches that the fact that employer retaliation is unlawful
does not make it unlikely. The well-documented prevalence of
employer discrimination based on union activity, clearly prohibited
23 0
by section 8(a)(3) of the Act, is powerful evidence to this effect.

Contract and the Prospects for Union Representation, 98 HARV. L. REv. 351, 388-94
(1984);Julius G. Getman, The Strike atJay: The Evil of Mackay (1991) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter The Strike at Jay]. But see David
Westfall, StrikerReplacements and Employee Freedom of Choice, 7 LAB. LAW. 137 (1991)
(defending the Mackay doctrine).
See Finkin, supra note 228, at 567-69. The long-overdue statutory reversal of
Mackay is currently under consideration by Congress. See H.R. 5, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1991) (prohibiting permanent replacement of strikers); S. 55, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1991) (amending NLRA and Railway Labor Act to prevent discrimination based
on participation in labor disputes). Both bills would add permanent replacement of
strikers to the list of employer unfair labor practices, but only in the unionized
workplace, leaving employers free to permanently replace unorganized workers who
walk off the job in protest.
230 See Michael H. Gottesman, Rethinking Labor Law Preemption: State Laws
FacilitatingUnionization, 7 YALEJ. REG. 355, 363-65 (1990); Paul C. Weiler, Promises
to Keep: SecuringWorkers'Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV.
1769, 1778-81 (1983) [hereinafter Weiler, Promises]. Professsor Weiler's conclusions
about the prevalence of anti-union discharges were questioned in RobertJ. LaLonde
& Bernard D. Meltzer, Hard Times for Unions: Another Look at the Significance of
Employer Illegalities, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 953 (1991). But see Professor Weiler's
response, Paul C. Weiler, Hard Timesfor Unions: ChallengingTimesfor Scholars, 58 U.
CI. L. REV. 1015 (1991), arguing that Professors Lalonde and Meltzer had
misconstrued his conclusions, misinterpreted the data, and misunderstood the
significance of the widespread employer illegality that they themselves found.
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The employer's ownership of the enterprise and of the premises
gives it the power to fire workers and to eject them from the
workplace, even in the face of a federal statutory prohibition,
subject only to whatever remedies or penalties the law provides after
the fact. 23 1 The worst that can befall an employer who is found
to have unlawfully fired a worker for engaging in protected
concerted activity is an order some years after the event to reinstate
the worker (if she still wants the job) and to make her whole for any
back pay actually lost, after subtracting other earnings. 23 2 An
employer who calculates the likely cost of an eventual finding of
liability, discounted by its probability'and the delay in its implementation, may well decide that the benefits of ridding the organization
of the offending employee vastly outweigh the costs. 23 3 The
typical employee, for her part, is capable of making the same rough
calculation, and is likely to be deterred except under quite unusual
circumstances.
To some extent, then, the consequences of expanding the range
of permissible subjects of concerted activity under section 7
protection are limited by what I believe to be unwarranted restrictions of the rights of employees and by the woeful inadequacy of the
Board's administrative enforcement scheme. But even if enforcement mechanisms were reasonably effective, the substantial risk of
even temporary job loss is not something that employees are likely
to court on a whim. They must be highly motivated to undertake
what they surely, and often correctly, believe to be a substantial risk
of employer retaliation in some form. Fear of job loss and the
difficulty and delay that face an employee seeking to enforce her
legal rights are, at least as to unorganized employees, likely to deter
the vast bulk of criticism just as they deter union activity. Indeed,
the deterrence is likely to be even greater as to "altruistic" criticism
than as to union organizing, the protected status of which has been
established for 50 years, and which at least carries the eventual
prospect of economic rewards.
In the case of the NLRA, disregard of the Act is encouraged by long delays in
the enforcement process (four to eight years from discharge to enforcement of a
reinstatement order is not uncommon), see Weiler, supra note 230, at 1795-97, and
the lack of punitive sanctions or even fully compensatory relief. See id. at 1787-93.
232 See Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 1 N.L.R.B. 1, 51 (1935).
235 See generally Gottesman, supra note 230, at 363-64 (considering the deterrent
effect of employer resistance and retaliation on union activity); Weiler, Promises, supra
note 230, at 1787-97 (discussing the willingness of employers to commit unfair labor
practices because of the inherent weakness of the NLRA's remedy structure).
231
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In sum, the extent of employee protest is greatly restricted by
independent limitations embedded in the labor laws as well as by
the realities of the employment relationship. For better or worse,
there is no reason to believe that broadened section 7 protection
will yield an outpouring of employee speech or other protest on
issues of public consequence.
D. What Remains of "ProductDisparagement"?

Existing law greatly limits the additional protection that would
be afforded by the proposal. On the other hand, the broad
definition of "mutual aid or protection" proposed here would
clearly undermine the foundations of the "product disparagement"
doctrine of Jefferson Standard: it could no longer be said that the
subject matter of such activity was not within the proper purview of
employee concerns. But there might yet remain arguments for
withholding protection from some product disparagement. I
consider and reject below the argument for denying protection to
tacticalproduct criticism of the sort illustrated inJefferson Standardin which criticism of the employer's product is used as a device for
advancing unrelated and undisclosed economic objectives. But I
concede the existence of other circumstances in which product
criticism might remain outside the scope of an expanded section 7.
1. Tactical Criticism of the Employer or its Product
The tactical use of public criticism of the employer and its
product to achieve economic aims presents perhaps the least
appealing case for expanding section 7 protection. The case for
recognizing the broader interests of employees is surely weaker
here, in that the employees may not in fact be interested in the
subject of their communication, but only in its utility in pressuring
the employer to make economic concessions. Moreover, employers
may see the greatest threat of product or other criticism as coming
from employees who are motivated not by concern about the subject
of their public disclosure but by traditional economic objectives.
Permitting a broader range of protest on subjects of public interest
might seem to vastly increase employee leverage in support of
traditional economic demands. 23 4 Yet I do not believe these
This possibility would be limited by existing doctrine prohibiting unions'
insistence on, and use of economic pressure in support of, nonmandatory demands
as a condition for agreement on mandatory topics. Seesupra text accompanying notes
234
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circumstances call for the denial of section 7 protection to this
activity.
In general it is held not to be the province of the Board or the
courts to attempt to calibrate the balance of economic weaponry. 235 To that extent this objection to broader section 7 coverage
is misdirected.23 6 Indeed, given the. enormous advantages that
employers have in their contest with labor under current law and
economic conditions, 23 7 a mandate to adjust the balance could
more plausibly be turned around to support broader protection of
employee criticism of the employer.
Objections to the purely tactical use of product disparagement
and other "public-oriented" criticism of the employer of the sort
illustrated by Jefferson Standard may reflect as well a fear that the
public may be unfairly duped into supporting labor's cause. As the
Supreme Court stated in Jefferson Standard, "[a] disclosure of [the
economic] motive might have lost more public support for the
employees than it would have gained, for it would have given the
handbill more the character of coercion than of collective bargain23 8
ing."
Denial of section 7 protection is not an appropriate response to
this problem. My central claim is that product quality and other
aspects of the employer's conduct are themselves legitimate objects
of employee concern. If that claim is accepted, it would be
anomalous to deny protection to such criticism on the ground that
the criticism is actually motivated by the employees' desire to
achieve improvements in wages and working conditions-objectives
that lie at the core of the Act. 23 9 It makes little sense to deny
220-24.
235 See e.g., American Shipbuilding Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 317 (1965)
(holding that the statute does not confer on the Board a "general authority to assess

the relative economic power of the adversaries in the bargaining process and to deny
weapons to one party or the other because of its assessment of that party's bargaining
power").
See Getman, supra note 20, at 1239.
See Weiler, supra note 228, at 358-63; The Strike atJay, supra note 228. For
further discussion of the significance of employer countermeasures in assessing the
236
237

consequences of this proposal, see supra text accompanying notes 227-29.
238 NLRB v. Local Union 1229, IBEW, 346 U.S. 464, 477 (1953).
239 Even in Jefferson Standard the Court acknowledged that the existence of a

traditional economic objective potentially strengthened the employees' claim to § 7
protection. The Court took it as self-evident that the leaflet would have been
unprotected absent this employee dispute, then added that the existence of the
dispute afforded the employees "no substantial defense." Id. at 476-77.
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protection to otherwise-protected conduct on the basis of an
otherwise-protected motive.
There are additional reasons for not excluding this kind of
"tactical" product criticism from protection. To make the sincerity
of employees' expressed concerns decisive would raise troubling
issues of proof and introduce great uncertainty about the scope of
protection. Moreover, and perhaps more to the point of employer
concerns, protecting "tactical" product criticism seems unlikely to
increase its prevalence substantially, for this sort of activity will be
undertaken, generally speaking, only by employees who are already
organized and engaged in collective bargaining. Those employees
are already relatively well-situated to circumvent the proscription
against product disparagement if they are so inclined. Recall that
under current law employees can quite readily gain protection for
a broad range of public criticism of the employer where it is made
in connection with a traditional labor dispute: simple disclosure of
the employees' traditional economic objectives is usually sufficient
to bring public criticism on other issues within the protection of the
statute. 240 Moreover, current limits on section 7 protection have
little effect on truthful criticism or disclosures made by nonemployee agents or allies of the union, who cannot be discharged but
can only be sued for defamation in limited circumstances.
Finally, if the impact of product criticism by employees is
thought to be blunted by public knowledge of the existence of a
labor dispute, it remains open for the employer to supply this
information, as well as to respond to the substance of the criticism.
Consequently, I see no compelling reason for withholding protection from concerted employee criticism of the employer's conduct
or product on the ground that it is actually motivated by undisclosed economic objectives.
2. Disclosure or Criticism that Contravenes Specific
Job Responsibilities
What about the sales representatives who personally criticize the
product they must then try to sell? Or the public relations spokespersons who lambast the company environmental practices they are
charged with defending? These employees may have violated the
specific requirements of their job, and, the employer may argue,
rendered themselves ineffective in thatjob for the future. Similarly,

240

See supra text accompanying notes 67-74.
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the employees who reveal specific "trade secrets" entrusted to
them-confidential, closely held information about the product or
manufacturing process that would be useful to competitors-may
241
violate very specific obligations to the employer.
In the unusual case in which" employees within the Act's protection engage in concerted activity of this sort, there may yet be an
argument for withholding protection. To do so one would not need
to assert a categorical limitation on the scope of employee concerns.
Nor would one need to resort to generalized notions of employee
loyalty or of managerial prerogatives, of the sort discussed below,
to explain the nature of the employer's interest in proscribing the
conduct. In these cases the employer's interest is stronger, and the
employee's interest is arguably weaker, in light of the specific
obligations violated by the employee. Exceptions to the scope of
section 7 rendering some such conduct unprotected, and permitting
discharge of employees who engage in it, are not necessarily
incompatible with my fundamental premise that employees have a
legitimate interest in all aspects of their employer's conduct and
policies.
In working out the application of a broader definition of section
7 interests to particular fact situations, the Board and the courts will
have to confront just the sort of issues it already confronts in many
contexts under section 7: when does an employee's conduct,
presumptively protected as concerted activity, nevertheless violate
the legitimate rules of the workplace or the legitimate demands of
the employer, so as to take it outside of section 7 protection? It has
long been established, for example, that an employer may fire an
employee who hands out union literature during working time, in
violation of a nondiscriminatory, uniformly enforced company rule
prohibiting such conduct. 242 Similarly, employees who concertedly refuse to perform certain work assignments while remaining on
the job,2 43 or who deliberately time a work stoppage so as to
244
cause serious physical damage to the employer's property,
241 That is, obligations more specific than the "duty of loyalty" invoked injefferson

Standard. See infra notes 270-75 and accompanying text (discussing the common law

duty of loyalty).
242 See Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 803-04 n.10 (1945).
243 See, e.g., NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 157 F.2d 486 (8th Cir. 1946)
(holding that a refusal to process orders from employer's plant in another city
wherein the employees were on strike is unprotected); Elk Lumber Co., 91 N.L.R.B.
333,2 44336 (1950) (holding that work slowdowns are unprotected).
See NLRB v. Marshall Car Wheel & Foundry Co., 218 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1955).
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although literally engaged in "concerted activity for mutual aid or
protection," may find themselves beyond the bounds set by judicial
and administrative interpretation of section 7. Without accepting
all of these sundry exceptions to the literal scope of section 7,245
or fully delineating the additional exceptions that might follow
acceptance of the proposal, I do wish to make clear that broadening
the scope of section 7 protection as I propose would not preclude
the development of narrow exceptions that remove that protection
under some circumstances. It would, however, lift an unjustified
categorical restriction on the legitimate topics of employee protest
under the Act.
E. The Relationship Between Expanded Section 7 Coverage
and State Remedies for Wrongful Discharge
It is evident that the proposed expansion of section 7 coverage
would overlap, to a far greater degree than under current law, with
some existing (and emerging) state remedies for wrongful discharge.
In particular, some private "whistleblowers" who have a remedy
under state law would be afforded an additional remedy under
section 7. This overlap raises two important questions: First, would
the NLRA preempt these state remedies, substituting what for many
employees would be a less satisfactory alternative under section
7?246
And second, why not simply leave these cases to the
continuing development of state law remedies? Why bother to add
a new layer of protection for conduct that is increasingly protected
by state common law?
Federal preemption would be wholly inappropriate. First,
no
state remedy for wrongful discharge in this context could actually
conflict with federal law; the NLRA does not protect any discharges
but simply remains indifferent to those it does not prohibit.
Moreover, the inquiry of a state court in a wrongful discharge suit
245 See supra note 217 (criticizing Elk Lumber).
246 Preemption is a concern because some wrongful discharge claims might be
construed as calling for the regulation of conduct that is "arguably prohibited" by the
Act: discharge of an employee for exercise of newly expanded § 7 rights. It would
thus come within the expansive terms of"Garmon preemption." See San Diego Bldg.
Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959) (holding that when an activity
is subject to the NLRA, both state and federal courts must defer to the exclusive
competence of the NLRB). But these cases appear to fall within established
exceptions to Garmon. See infra text accompanying notes 247-50. For a thoughtful
reassessment of the appropriate scope of labor preemption doctrines, see Gottesman,
supra note 230, at 391-410.
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would be entirely different from the inquiry under section 7. The
former would typically be completely unconcerned with the
existence of joint employee activity, for example, and would focus
almost exclusively on an issue that is decidedly secondary under
section 7: the public interest in hearing what the employee has to
say. 247 Finally, these state wrongful discharge cases represent the
vindication of "clear mandates of public policy" in a particular state,
making them especially inappropriate candidates for preemption.248 The state's determination of a wrongful discharge claim
by an employee who might, given certain additional allegations, also
state a claim under section 7 poses no risk of interfering with the
NLRB's primary jurisdiction to administer national labor policy, or
of upsetting the balance of power between employers and workers
acting collectively to advance their own interests. 249 There would
2 50
be no basis for invoking preemption in this kind of case.
This is important because workers who would otherwise have
access to a state judicial remedy for wrongful discharge are quite
247 The very different focus of the state law inquiry and the would-be ULP inquiry

contributed to the Court's creation of exceptions to Garmon for libel actions in Linn
v. United Plant Guard Workers Local 114,383 U.S. 53, 63 (1966), and for intentional
infliction of emotional distress in Farmer v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters &
Joiners Local 25, 430 U.S. 290, 302-05 (1977).
248 Preemption is to be avoided where the state is indicating interests "deeply
rooted in local feeling and responsibility." See Farmer, 430 U.S. at 296 (quoting
Garmon, 359 U.S. at 244); Linn, 383 U.S. at 61. This phrase seems tailor made for the
public policy type of wrongful discharge cases.
249 The remote risk of interference with national labor policy was also critical in
Farmer,430 U.S. at 298, and Linn, 383 U.S. at 63.
250 Professor Michael Gottesman proffers another more innovative response to the
preemption argument: preemption should not apply to state regulation of activity
that is arguably prohibited by the NLRA but that Congress has not regulated on a
"continuum"-that is, "subjects where Congress regulated up to a point but was
indifferent as to what happened beyond that point." Gottesman, supra note 230, at
359. Thus, Professor Gottesman argues that states should be permitted to prohibit
the discharge of union activists: Congress has prohibited the discharge of union
activists but has not granted any affirmative right to employers to discharge
employees for other reasons. See id. at 395. (This is in contrast to picketing, which
Congress has protected up to one point on a continuum and prohibited beyond that
point. See id.) There is no risk in this context that additional state remedies for antiunion discharges will conflict with federal policy, for example, by defining the
prohibited conduct more broadly and thereby infringing on protected conduct.
While acceptance of Professor Gottesman's argument would fully dispel any
preemption difficulties with my proposal as well, it goes further than I need to go.
Because the state remedy at issue here-wrongful discharge for, in essence,
whistleblowing-does not regulate collective bargaining or union organizing at all, and
is grounded in clear and important state policy mandates, it should not be preempted
under existing doctrine.
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likely to prefer it.2 51 The standard remedy for a wrongful discharge under state law is full compensation, and perhaps punitive
damages, whereas the Board is empowered only to give reinstatement and backpay. 252 Moreover, the plaintiff in a wrongful
discharge suit may invoke a panoply of procedures-full discovery
and elaborate judicial process-that are unavailable under the
NLRA.253
But given all this, what is the point of creating an additional
remedy under the NLRA for this kind of conduct? The point is,
first, to recognize as a matter of national labor policy that employees themselves have a broader range of concerns than the law now
holds. From a more practical perspective, the point is to create a
broadly accessible, even if not wholly adequate, remedy for
employer retaliation against concerted employee conduct in support
of these concerns. Wrongful discharge law affords significant
advantages to those few who can successfully invoke it; but that is
few indeed.25 4 The substantive law is spotty, varying enormously
and somewhat arbitrarily among different jurisdictions; only a
fraction of the cases that my proposal would cover would meet the
substantive strictures of wrongful discharge law in their respective
state courts. 255 Equally important is the high cost of litigation,
which keeps the great majority of potential claims out of court
25 See id. at 370-72.
252 See id., see also supra text accompanying note 232.
255 See id. For these same reasons, I foresee little risk that the proposal would

discourage or slow the continued development of state wrongful discharge law. Most
of the pressure for that development comes out of cases involving individual
whistleblowing conduct that would not be protected under § 7 because it was not
"concerted" in nature.
254 For a comprehensive argument delineating the shortcomings of litigated
wrongful discharge remedies, see WElLER, supra note 8, at 78-82.
255 The "public policy" exception remains the rare exception to the presumption
that employment is terminable "at will." It is often found inapplicable to cases
involving termination for mere disclosure or criticism of wrongful conduct, as
opposed to refusal to engage in wrongful conduct. See, e.g., Adler v. American
Standard Corp., 830 F.2d 1303, 1304 (4th Cir. 1987) ("employment termination
motivated by a desire to conceal wrongdoing [from] higher corporate officers does
not violate Maryland's public policy"); Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 319 A.2d
174, 178-80 (Pa. 1974) (finding that salesman fired for complaining internally about
safety and quality of product stated no public policy claim). The remedy also depends
in most states on the existence ofa "clear mandate of public policy," which may pose
a serious hurdle. See, e.g., Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 514
(N.J. 1980) (holding that a doctor fired for refusing to work on development of drug
she regarded as potentially dangerous stated no public policy claim; no "clear
mandate of public policy" violated).
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simply because the claimants cannot attract competent counsel to
256
prosecute them.
Under the NLRA's administrative enforcement mechanism, the
Board's General Counsel itself prosecutes cases deemed meritorious; the process costs the employee nothing. Inadequate though it
is, the process affords a low-cost mechanism that is widely and
uniformly available to employees who would have no chance of7
25
gaining a hearing on their claim in state court or otherwise.
Although it is important that the state remedy is not foreclosed
through preemption where it is available, it is also important to
recognize that the state judicial remedies do not begin to address
the claims of the great majority of workers who might benefit from
the proposed change in section 7 law. The proposed expansion of
section 7 coverage is likely to affect primarily small, unorganized
groups of employees who are sufficiently concerned about an issue,
be it patient welfare or environmental practices, to face the
substantial risk of employer displeasure and retaliation. Organized
workers, who are more likely to act with the benefit of legal advice,
already have available to them means of publicizing their criticisms
without running afoul of the limitations on section 7.258 It is
often unorganized workers engaged in spontaneous protests who get
caught outside the protective reach of section 7.259 Particularly
as to these situations, the policies of section 7, bolstered by the
public interest in gaining this sort of information, presumptively
support the employees' claim to protection.
IV. RECONCEIVING THE COUNTERVAILING INTERESTS OF EMPLOYERS:
THE DUTY OF LOYALTY AND MANAGERIAL PREROGATIVES

The limited definition currently given the term "mutual aid or
protection" reflects a lack of appreciation for the breadth of the
interests that the employee's role in the production process can
generate. But more is at work here: employer interests that
compete with the rights of employees, to which the courts have
256 See WEILER, supra note 8, at 81-82.
2571 acknowledge that, barring the commitment of additional resources for
enforcement, the prosecution of these new cases might draw resources away from the
already inadequate prosecution of more traditional ULPs, such as discharge ofunion
activists. That would be extremely unfortunate, but it does notjustify the retention

of an inappropriate restriction on the recognized scope of employee concerns.
258 See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
259 Almost all of the cases discussed above in which § 7 coverage was denied
involved nonunion workplaces. See supra text accompanying notes 82-92.
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historically been highly sensitive, have pushed the courts toward a
limited conception of employee rights. In particular, the employer's
interest in the loyalty of its employees and, more broadly, in the
unfettered exercise of its "managerial prerogatives" outside the
traditional field of labor relations seems to account in great measure
for the resistance to a broader conception of employee interests.
Those same interests are sure to be asserted against the change
proposed in this Article. In this Section, I scrutinize these employer
interests and their role in arriving at an appropriate definition of
the scope of employee interests protected by section 7.
A. Employees' Duty of Loyalty as a Limitation on Section 7

"Product disparagement" was held in Jefferson Standard to be
"indefensible" and "disloyal." 260 We must therefore consider
whether the unprotected status of criticism of the employer's
operations outside the labor relations area is grounded in and
justified by employees' duty of loyalty to their employer.
Where does this duty of loyalty come from? It cannot be located
in any provision of the NLRA. The Court in Jefferson Standard
located a duty of loyalty in section 10(c) of the Act, 261 added by
the 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments, 262 which prohibits the reinstatement of any employee fired for "just cause." On this reading,
activity within the ambit of section 7 could nonetheless be lawful
grounds for discharge if it was "disloyal" and therefore provided
"just cause." 263 That construction of the Act would have had the
effect, as the dissent pointed out, of substantially repealing section
7, something Congress expressly declined to do in 1947,264 and
260 The Court held that the employees' conduct manifested
such detrimental disloyalty as to provide 'cause' for [the company's] refusal
to continue in its employ the perpetrators of the attack.... There is no
more elemental cause for discharge of an employee than disloyalty to his
employer. It is equally elemental that the Taft-Hartley Act seeks to
strengthen, rather than to weaken, that cooperation, continuity of service
and cordial contractual relation between employer and employee that is
born of loyalty to their common enterprise.
NLRB v. Local Union 1229, IBEW (Jefferson Standard), 346 U.S. 464, 472 (1953)
(footnote omitted).
261 See 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1988);Jefferson Standard, 346 U.S. at 472, 477-78.
262 See Labor Management Relations Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified at
29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197).
263 SeeJefferson Standard, 346 U.S. at 477-78.
264 See id. at 479-80 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see also infra text accompanying
notes 278-81.
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was soon abandoned.2 65 Jefferson Standard now stands for the
exclusion of certain "disloyal" conduct from the protection of
section 7 itself.2 6 Detaching the duty of loyalty from the "just
cause" language of section 10(c), though entirely proper, leaves it
with no greater support in the express provisions of the NLRA than
the public interest I posit in hearing employee criticism.
The duty of loyalty invoked in Jefferson Standard, as it now
stands, seems to stem not from the Act itself but from legal rules
predating the Act. 267 Under the common law, the employment
relationship is governedby a species of agency law that is still often
referred to as the law of "master and servant." Under those
common law principles employees have a general duty of loyalty
toward their principal or employer: a duty to act in the interest of
the employer and to refrain from damaging the employer's
business. 268 This general duty of loyalty encompasses an obligation not to publicly criticize the employer's product or service or to
269
disclose potentially harmful information about the employer.
Although the common law concept of disloyalty might seem to
fit the employees' conduct at issue in Jefferson Standard, it does not
adequately explain the limitations on employee interests that
underlie the decision. First, the common law duty of loyalty would
probably not bar internal criticism, which has been held unprotected under section 7 where it is insufficiently related to terms and
conditions of employment.27 0 Moreover, even the common law
recognized an overriding privilege under some circumstances to
disclose information harmful to the employer in order to protect
the interests of the employee or of others. 271 The evolving law of
2 65

See NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 12-13 (1962).

This

development is set forth in Getman, supra note 20, at 1233-34.
266 See Getman, supra note 20, at 1238-40. That had been the Board's view in
Jefferson Standard. SeeJefferson Standard,346 U.S. at 477-78.
267 See ATLESON, supra note 40, at 87-91.
268 See 53 AM.JUR. 2D Masterand Servant § 97 (1970) ("An employer has the right

to expect loyalty from his employees . . . ." (citation omitted)); 56 C.J.S. Masterand
Servant § 42a (1948) ("As a general proposition, any act of the servant which injures
or has a tendency to injure his master's business, interests, or reputation will justify
the dismissal of the servant."); id. § 42e ("One who.., performs acts... disloyal to
his employer commits a breach of an implied condition of the contract of employment
which may warrant discharge." (citation omitted)).
26 9
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395 (1958) (setting forth the duty not

to reveal information acquired in the course of employment "to the injury of the
principal").
270 See supra text accompanying notes 91-92.
271 Thus, the Restatement characterizes the duty of loyalty as a duty "not to act
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wrongful discharge effectively expands this privilege under the
common law, 272 while the First Amendment has made deep
inroads on the duty of loyalty in the public sector. 27 These
developments in the law reflect an increasing willingness to override
the traditional obligations of employees toward their employers
when the public interest is at stake. Yet employee speech in the
interest of the public continues to be held unprotected under
section 7.274 If the duty of loyalty cited in Jefferson Standard
emanates, as it seems to, from the common law of agency, then that
duty in its current form is too narrow to account for the wholesale
exclusion from section 7 of criticism of the employer and its
2 75
product.
At least some of the conduct at issue, however, would surely
constitute a violation of the common law duty of loyalty. But that
is only the beginning of the matter, for the duty of loyalty, groundor speak disloyally in matters which are connected with his employment except in the
protection of his own interests or those of others." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 387 cmt. b (1958) (emphasis added). As an illustration, the Restatement cites an
employee of a life insurance company who "in good faith advocates legislation which
would require a change in the policies issued by the company. [The employee] has
violated no duty to [the company]." Id. illus. 3; see also id. § 395 cmt. f (describing
an agent's privilege to reveal information "in the protection of a superior interest of
himself or of a third person," such as information that the principal is committing a
crime). See generally Phillip I. Blumberg, CorporateResponsibility and the Employee's
Duty of Loyalty and Obedience: A PreliminayInquiy, 24 OKIA. L. REV. 279, 283-89
(1971) (discussing an employee's duties of obedience, loyalty, and confidentiality as
they relate to proposals to protect private-sector "whistleblowing").
272 See generally Blumberg, supra note 271, at 307-12 (analyzing the possibility of
further limitations on the employer's right of discharge).
273 Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968), can be understood as
holding that public employees' freedom of expression, including the freedom to
criticize their employer's conduct, outweighs any general duty of loyalty that the
employees owe to their employer. See Blumberg, supra note 271, at 300-07. Connick
v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983), in limiting that freedom strictly to "matters of public
concern," might then be seen as reinstating the employees' duty of loyalty beyond
that core.
274 Thus, for example, the nursing home employee in Autumn Manor, Inc., 268
N.L.R.B. 239 (1983) (discussed supra text accompanying note 90), fired for testifying
about possible abuse of patients, would seem to come within the privilege for
advancing the superior interests of others.
275 In fact, the "disloyalty" strain ofJefferson Standardmay come into play only in
a case likeJefferson Standarditself,in which the employees' objective-the advancement
of undisclosed economic aims-is concededly within the realm of "mutual aid or
protection." In the absence of such ulterior (and protected) motives, there is no need
to call upon the duty of loyalty to override § 7 rights because the employees' criticism
is simply not within the "mutual aid or protection" clause. The question then
remains: why is that so? The concept of managerial prerogatives, discussed below,
suggests an answer.
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ed in state common law, at least arguably conflicts with the express
federal statutory rights of employees under section 7 of the Act.
How is the common law duty of loyalty to be reconciled with section
7 of the NLRA?
The idea of "disloyalty" could'play any one of three conceptually
distinct functions in the interpretation of the Act. First, it could
represent a countervailing employer "right" that trumps section 7.
This view would make sense only if that common law right were of
constitutional dimensions.2 7 6 But the conceptual foundations of
such a claim, reminiscent of the Lochner era, were swept away to
make room for the New Deal and, particularly, the Wagner Act
itself.277

The argument that section 7 cannot sanction disloyal

conduct, and is overridden to the extent it does, is a throwback,
long discarded and superseded by contemporary legal theory and
social realities.
An alternative understanding of the meaning of disloyalty under
the statute is as a residual employer "right"-one that simply fills the
space left untouched by section 7. On that view the employer has
a right to the loyalty of its employees, and to freedom from
criticism, but only as to matters beyond the scope of section 7.
Disloyal conduct, like tardiness or absenteeism, would be among the
many grounds as to which the employer retains unconstrained
discretion to fire or otherwise discipline employees. There is
nothing strictly illogical in this view, but it would render the
concept of disloyalty completely gratuitous in the interpretationof
276 Given the conception of "property" that existed in that era, such an argument
would not have been far-fetched. The federal courts in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries developed abroad notion of "property" as encompassing the right
to do business, to seek customers and to hire workers free from outside interference.
See Forbath, supra note 123, at 1169-72; Haggai Hurvitz, American LaborLaw and the
Doctrineof EntrepreneurialPropertyRights: Boycotts, Courts,and theJuridicalReorientation
of 1886-1895, 8 INDUS. REL. L.J. 307, 308-09 (1986). This expanded conception of

employers' property rights became the foundation both for enjoining strikes and
boycotts, see Hurvitz, supra at 339-44, and for invalidating pro-labor legislation,
primarily under the Due Process Clause. See e.g., Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312
(1921) (invalidating state law restricting the use of injunctions in labor disputes);
Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (invalidating law prohibiting yellow dog
contracts).
277 See NLRB v.Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. 1 (1937); West Coast Hotel Co.
v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). For an elegant exposition of the meaning of the 1937
cases, see Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873 (1987).
Professor Sunstein argues that West CoastHotel represented a rejection of the Lochner

Court's view that nineteenth-century common law rights established the constitutional
baseline, modifications of which treaded on vested rights, and thus violated the Due
Process Clause. See id. at 876-83.
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section 7; it would come into play only after we had determined the
scope of statutory protection.
The concept of disloyalty necessarily seems to operate under the
Act neither by trumping section 7 rights nor merely by occupying
some of the space left over by section 7; rather, it functions as a
guide to interpretation, a reason for choosing a narrower rather
than a broader reading of section 7. The question at hand is
therefore whether section 7 can or should be read to coexist with
the employer's interest in the loyalty of its employees and in its
freedom from unwanted disclosures or criticism.
It would be difficult to make the case that Congress affirmatively
intended to preserve the traditional duty of loyalty that employees
bore toward their employer, and to limit the meaning of section 7
accordingly. It seems that the 1947 Congress, in declining to amend
the relevant language of section 7,278 approved the already-established withdrawal of protection from concerted activity that violated
laws against violence or prolonged physical occupation of property,2 79 or obligations that were imposed by or strongly implicit in
the Act itself.2 80 But even assuming those legislative views are
relevant, they stop far short of approving the denial of section 7
protection on grounds of disloyalty, a dangerously pliable limitation
28 1
on employee rights.
278 The Taft-Hartley Act did amend § 10(c) of the Act to prohibit the reinstatement of an employee firedforjust cause, see Pub. L. No. 80-101, § 101, 61 Stat. 136,
147 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1988)), but, as discussed above, that
provision should not be read as permitting discharge based on protected concerted
activity on the ground that it is disloyal.
279 The Conference Report approved the Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v.
Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939), holding that § 7 did not protect
employees who had engaged in a prolonged "sit-down" strike involving destruction
of employer property. See H.R. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 38-39 (1947)
[hereinafter H.R. Rep. No. 510], reprinted in SENATE SUBcOM. ON LABOR OF THE
COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 93D CONG. 2D SESS., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 542-43 (Comm. Print 1974)
[hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF LMRA].
280 The Conference Report on the Taft-Hartley Act also noted with approval the
Board's holdings that § 7 did not protect a strike to compel violation of the Act or
of federal wage stabilization laws, or strikes in violation of collective bargaining
agreements. See H.R. Rep. No. 510, supra note 279, at 39, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF LMRA, supra note 279, at 543.
28' After reporting the existing limits to § 7 protection, the Conference Report
explained: 'By reason of the foregoing, it was believed that the specific provisions
in the House bill excepting unfair labor practices, unlawful concerted activities, and
violation of collective bargaining agreements from the protection of section 7 were
unnecessary." Id. The Conference Report went on to express "real concern that the
inclusion of such a provision might have a limiting effect and make improper conduct
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One might still contend that the employee's duty of loyalty is
inherent in the employment relationship in a capitalist society, so
deeply embedded in the legal and social fabric that it need not be
articulated. In promulgating a broad but not wholly unambiguous
grant of employee rights such as section 7, it might be argued that
Congress must have intended to preserve these basic obligations of
loyalty. But this view of what Congress must have meant to do is
hard to reconcile with what it did. The Court's demand for
"loyalty" in Jefferson Standard seems strangely discordant in the
context of a statute that explicitly protects the economic strike-that
is, the deliberate and calculated imposition of economic hardship
on the employer, including appeals to workers to withhold their
labor and customers their patronage, for the purpose of extracting
a greater share of the profits and wresting away a substantial degree
of control from management. And if "disloyalty" means anything,
then it would seem to encompass organizing a union, which entails
soliciting other members of the workforce to introduce an outside
entity whose purpose and methods are in many ways hostile to the
employer and its economic self-interest. 28 2 Every economic strike
and every attempt to organize a union involves conduct that
employers might rationally, and probably do in fact, regard as
indefensibly disloyal. 8 3 Yet those activities are at the heart of
section 7. In the context of this statutory scheme, it is hard to
sustain the claim that Congress simply took for granted the
overriding obligations of loyalty that bound employees to employers
under the common law, and implicitly intended to limit the scope
of section 7 accordingly.
not specifically mentioned subject to the protection of the act." Id. Although
Congress in 1947 may have envisioned some additional exceptions to § 7, there is no
basis for stretching beyond the general categories recognized at that time-that is,

activity that ran afoul of specific prohibitions or policies of the Act or that was
unlawful under other state laws of general application. A sweeping limitation based
on a "duty of loyalty" would do just that. See NLRB v. Local Union 1229, IBEW
(Jefferson Standard), 346 U.S. 464, 479-80 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
282 For a recent illustration of employer views on this score, see Gatliff Business
Products, Inc. 276 N.L.R.B. 543, 550, 554 (1985), in which an employer discharged

employees for the "treasonous" and "disloyal" acts of supporting the union and voting
in a representation election.
283 See Getman, supra note 20, at 1238 (noting that virtually all economic pressure
and union organizing could be deemed "disloyal" to the employer). Justice
Frankfurter made the same point in dissent inJefferson Standard: "Many of the legally
recognized tactics and weapons of labor would readily be condemned for 'disloyalty'
were they employed between man and man in friendly personal relations." Jefferson
Standard,346 U.S. at 479-80 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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In outlawing the discharge of employees whom employers would
reasonably regard as disloyal, 'Congress dramatically transformed the
nature of the employment relationship. The Wagner Act represented a sharp break from the master-servant paradigm, freeing
employees from onerous common law restrictions on their ability to
join together with their fellow workers on matters of shared
concern. A duty of loyalty by employees seems to have been
constructed in Jefferson Standard out of the fragments of the
employment relationship that were left on the cutting room floor in
1935 with the passage of the Wagner Act.
It might yet be argued that while the NLRA modified the nature
of the employment relationship and the employee's common law
duty of loyalty, it did so only.within a limited arena wherein conflict
over terms and conditions of employment was viewed as inevitable,
while preserving the duty of loyalty outside that arena. This is not
a wholly implausible construction of the Act, though it rests on a
concept of employee loyalty that has been much eroded; it is
precisely beyond the arena of terms and conditions of employment
that the courts are coming to recognize the overriding public
interest in open discussion about the activities of both public and
private employers, and thus in protecting employee expression on
such matters. This construction of the Act also depends upon a
limited vision of the genuine and legitimate interests of employees.
Once we recognize that employees themselves have an interest in
the employer's activities as they affect the public and consumers, the
duty of loyalty appears to be a feeble basis for denying section 7
protection to employees who pursue that interest.
B. "ManagerialPrerogatives"as a Limitation on Section 7

The "disloyalty" rationale of Jefferson Standard, even apart from
its obscure pedigree, is not an especially satisfying explanation for
the fundamental premise of the decision that employees have no
legitimate interest in the product or service they produce or in
other aspects of the enterprise they work for. To understand this
broad limitation on section 7 rights, we must turn to a correspondingly broad and pervasive conception of employer rights under the
NLRA: managerial prerogative.
Recall the Court's conviction in Jefferson Standard that "[t]he
policies attacked were those of finance and public relations for
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28
which management, not technicians, must be responsible." '
This pronouncement is more than a descriptive statement of the
actual interests of employees. It makes a normative claim that
echoes a strong current in the interpretation of the entire statutory
scheme of labor-management relations: the rights of employees
created by the Act are limited by the rights of employers to run
their businesses and to make basic business decisions without the
interference of employees and unions.
This commitment to the prerogatives of capital and its managers
pervades the interpretation of the Act.28 5 Decisions about the
product are simply one subset of the basic managerial decisions that
must be preserved, according to this prevailing dogma, from the
disruptive and unwarranted interference of employees. The depth
of this conviction is expressed by Justice Stewart in his influential
Fibreboard concurrence: he found it "hardly conceivable" that

"[d]ecisions concerning ...

advertising expenditures,

product

design, the manner of financing, and sales" could be subject to the
employer's duty to bargain, even though they might have an effect
onjob security and thus come within the literal scope of "conditions
of employment." 286 Such decisions, Justice Stewart stated, were
within the "core of entrepreneurial control" that was necessarily
excluded from the realm of collective bargaining under the
Act. 28 7 The opinion has been controversial as well as influential;
it foreshadowed the Court's inclusion within the "core of entrepreneurial control," and hence its exclusion from the duty to bargain,
of basic investment decisions that directly affectjob security, such as
partial or complete liquidation or expansion or contraction of the
scope of a business.2 8 Less controversy has attended the removal
28

jefferson Standard, 346 U.S. at 476.

285 See generally ATLESON, supra note 40, at 91-107 (discussing the origins in

property law of managerial prerogatives and the accommodation made to such
note 105, at 298-303
prerogatives by the courts); Klare,JudicialDeradicalization,supra
(discussing early case law examining managerial prerogatives).
286 Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203,223 (1964) (Stewart,

J., concurring).
2 87
288

Id.
Id. Fibreboarditself held that there was a duty to bargain over the decision to

subcontract part of the work performed by the bargaining unit. ButJustice Stewart's
concurrence, which sought to confine the breadth of the holding, became the basis
for the Court's subsequent decision in First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB,
452 U.S. 666, 676-77 (1981), holding that the decision to close part of a business was
within the area of entrepreneurial control preserved to unilateral management power,
free from the duty to bargain. Id. at 686. The FirstNationalMaintenance decision
and its conceptual foundations in the Stewart concurrence in Fibreboardhave been the
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of product-related and other such decisions from the list of
289
mandatory subjects of bargaining.
Yet the "basic managerial prerogatives" that were deemed so
important in these Supreme Court opinions are not even mentioned
in the statute. Employers were granted no rights by the Wagner
Act, and the rights they were granted by the Taft-Hartley Act were
only rights against specific enumerated labor practices. Nowhere
does the statute expressly recognize employers' right to make
certain managerial decisions unilaterally.
Of course, as in the case of the duty of loyalty, employers had
rights to manage their businesses, derived from state property law,
before the Act. Indeed, not so long before the Act those rights
were enshrined by judicial fiat in the Constitution. 290 The rights
of management were not eliminated by the Act,2 91 but they were
subject of widespread criticism. See, e.g., Staughton Lynd, Investment Decisionsand the
Quid Pro Quo Myth, 29 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 396, 416 (1979) (arguing that unilateral.
management control over investment decisionmaking renders illusory the traditional
"no-strike/arbitration tradeoff"); The Supreme Court; 1980 Term-Leading Cases, 95
HARV. L. REV. 93, 336-38 (1981) (chiding the FirstNationalMaintenancemajority for
its use of interest balancing in determining the scope of managerial prerogatives);
Jeffrey D. Hedlund, Note, An Economic Casefor Mandatory Bargainingover Partial
Termination and PlantRelocation Decisions, 95 YALE L.J. 949, 953-57 (1986) (arguing
that the economic rationale behind FirstNationalMaintenancefails in the absence of
a perfect market); Note, Subjects ofBargainingUnder the NLR.A and the Limits ofLiberal
PoliticalImagination,97 HARV. L. REV. 475, 477-80 (1983) (criticizing the distinction
between mandatory and permissive subjects of bargaining as unresponsive to the
interests of workers).
289 Indeed, Professor Michael Harper has proposed the exclusion from mandatory
bargaining of "all decisions that determine what products are created and sold, in
what quantities, for which markets and at what prices." Michael C. Harper, Leveling
the Roadfrom Borg-Warner to First National Maintenance: The Scope of Mandatoiy
Bargaining,68 VA. L. REV. 1447, 1450 (1982) (emphasis omitted). Others, however,
have questioned the basic distinction between mandatory and permissive topics of
bargaining, first announced in NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corp., 356
U.S. 342 (1958), in part because the categorical exclusion of certain topics is not
necessarily reflective of the actual interests of employees. See HARRY H. WELINGTON,
LABOR AND THE LEGAL PRocEss 63-90 (1968); Archibald Cox, Labor Decisions of the
Supreme Court at the OctoberTerm, 1957,44 VA. L. REV. 1057, 1086 (1958); Note, Major
Operational Decisions and Free Collective Bargaining: Eliminating the Mandatoryl
Permissive Distinction, 102 HARv. L. REv. 1971, 1981-86 (1989); see also Rabban, supra
note 127, at 711-16 (advocating abandonment of the distinction with respect to
professional employees based on those employees' "professional" concerns for a wide
range of matters often deemed to lie within management's prerogative); supra note
288.
290 See supra note 276 and accompanying text.
291 Indeed, several supporters of the Wagner Act expressly acknowledged the
employer's right to run the business. See e.g., To Create a National Labor Board,
Hearings on S. 2926 Before the Senate Comm. on Education and Labor, 73d Cong., 2d
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drastically limited by the NLRA and other New Deal legislation.
Indeed, much of the legal battle leading up to the New Deal era and
the Jones & Laughlin292 decision upholding the NLRA was fought
over the meaning of employer property rights; specifically, the
extent to which the ownership of property entailed the absolute
right to operate a business free from state (or employee) interference. 293 The invocation of managerial prerogatives, in the guise
of "property rights," to limit employee rights had a long history in
1935, with which Congress plainly determined to break. Employees
were given broad rights in section 7 that necessarily undermined
and compromised the managerial prerogatives that employers had
before the passage of the Act. 294 Just as the Act sanctions employee conduct that employers rationally regarded as "disloyal,"
similarly the Act sanctions and even encourages employee "interference"-by way of collective bargaining and economic pressure-with
what had been considered fundamental managerial prerogatives
such as setting of production schedules, use of subcontractors,
determination of wages and decisions on promotion, discipline and
discharge.
As in the case of "disloyalty," the concept of managerial
prerogatives is pulled from outside the statutory scheme, and
indeed from a legal background that was substantially repudiated in
Sess. 151 (1934), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NLRA, supra note 183,
at 181 (statement ofJohn L. Lewis: unions "give to the corporations the right to
regulate their own affairs"); 79 CONG. REC. 7673 (1935), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE NLRA, supra note 183, at 2394 (statement of Senator Walsh: it is
among the "fundamental rights" of employers that"[n]o one can compel an employer
to keep his factory open"). But what Congress did in promulgating § 7 and § 8 of the
Act drastically limited what had been important elements of the rights of employers
to run their business. See infra text accompanying note 294. The shape and source
of managerial prerogative recognized under the Act has been a major object of
inquiry among labor law scholars. See ATLESON, supra note 40, at 122-35; Paul
Barron, A Theory of Protected Employer Rights: A Revisionist Analysis of the Supreme
Court's Interpretationof the NationalLabor Relations Act, 59 TEx. L. REV. 421, 438-62
(1981); Harper, supra note 289, at 1462-81; Klare, supra note 169, at 1401-03; Stone,
supra note 169, at 1544-59.
292 NLRB v.Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
293 See supra note 276 and accompanying text.
294 Most importantly, the express prohibitions on employer interference with
concerted activities, § 8(a)(1) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), on discrimination
against union activists, § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3), and on refusing to bargain,
§ 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), represent quite drastic intrusions upon managerial

prerogatives. The dramatic import of the Act does not depend on the stronger claim
that it envisioned a more radical form of industrial democracy. Cf Klare,Judicial
Deradicalization,supranote 105, at 287-88 (discussing the sharp reaction by employers
to the Act's "radical potential").
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1935. When invoked to override or limit employee rights expressly
granted by the NLRA, the concept of managerial prerogative should
be scrutinized closely and with skepticism.
The public employee analogy is instructive here, for the
preservation of managerial prerogatives is also a prominent theme
in the Court's delineation of the constitutional rights of public
employees. 2 95 The Court sounded this theme in justifying the
public concern test of Connick: "When employee expression cannot
be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or
other concern to the community, government officials should enjoy
wide latitude in managing their offices, without intrusive oversight
by the judiciary in the name of the First Amendment." 296 And in
discussing the deference to be accorded the government even when
its discharge is motivated by employee speech on matters of public
concern, the Court returned to this theme, stressing "the government's legitimate purpose in 'promot[ing] efficiency and integrity
in the discharge of official duties, and [in] maintain[ing] proper
discipline in the public service.'"297 The Court went on to observe that "'the Government, as an employer, must have wide
discretion and control over the management of its personnel and
internal affairs. This includes the prerogative to remove employees
whose conduct hinders efficient operation and to do so with dispatch.'

298

The importance of the Court's concern for managerial prerogatives within the government cannot be overstated. Like the parallel
preoccupation with managerial prerogatives under the NLRA, the
imperative of public managerial discretion is invoked to justify a
categorical limitation on the express rights of employees, here
under the First Amendment. But the "core of managerial control"
reserved to the government employer is precisely the opposite of
that recognized under the NLRA: It encompasses those matters
295 See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985)
(recognizing "the government's interest in quickly removing an unsatisfactory
employee"); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146, 150-51 (1983); Bishop v. Wood, 426
U.S. 341, 349-50 (1976) (holding that the Due Process Clause does not protect
employees from "incorrect or ill-advised personnel decisions"). See generally
Lieberwitz, supra note 7, at 646-48 (arguing that Connick shifted the theoretical basis
of speech protection byjudging the utility of public employee speech by its value to
the economic system rather than the political system).
29r Connick, 461 U.S. at 146.
297 Id. at 150-51 (quoting Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371, 373 (1882)).
298 Id. at 151 (quoting Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 168 (1974) (Powell, J.,
concurring)).
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most closely related to the terms and conditions of employment of
the protesting employees and thus is held to justify the unfettered
power to discharge employees engaged in work-related protests.
These contrasting conceptions of managerial prerogative raise
an intriguing question: how is it that public enterprises would be
crippled by the protection of employee speech on terms and
conditions of employment, while private enterprise would suffer
most by permitting employee protest directed at those aspects of
the business most remote from terms and conditions of employment,
such as product quality? Stated differently, if private industry can
function, as it has for 50 years, under a regime that prohibits the
discharge of employees for protesting their terms and conditions of
employment, then why could the public employer not tolerate the
same type of dissent? Conversely, and more importantly for present
purposes, if the public employer is not disabled by permitting
criticism on "matters of public concern" such as "product quality,"
then why should we worry that the private employer could not
survive such criticism as well?2 99 Unless there is some fundamental difference in the way public and private managers do and must
manage their enterprises, the fear of undermining basic managerial
prerogatives seems to be exaggerated in both sectors. Several
decades of experience with employee speech rights in both public
and private employment suggest that both public and private
managers can well tolerate dissent of both the public-spirited and
the self-interested variety.
Of course there are some basic differences in the nature of
public and private managers. Two such differences seem potentially
relevant here: First, most private employers are in competition with
others; public agencies rarely face such competition. Second,
management of a private company is accountable to the company's
owners, and is charged with making a profit for those owners;
management of a public agency is charged with serving the public
and is ultimately accountable to the public. Do these differences
undermine the claim that private sector managers, like public sector
managers, should be required to tolerate public disclosures by
employees on matters of concern to the public?
The competitive context within which private employers operate
does render employers more vulnerable to employee disclosures of
this sort. Such disclosures may hurt the private employer more than
299 See Blumberg, supra note 271, at

298-307.
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they would hurt public employers if only because those consumers
or other customers who might be influenced by the damaging
disclosure generally have someplace else to turn; they can take their
business to a competitor. But it is not clear that this sort of
competitive injury is something that we-that is, the public and its
governmental andjudicial agents charged with interpreting the Actought to be especially concerned about.
We must begin by recognizing that only basically truthful
disclosures would be protected, for section 7 does not protect
00
speech that is deliberately or recklessly false and defamatory.
Moreover, only information that the public cares about and does
not already know will have any significant harmful effect on the
employer.301 The employer and its ability to compete will be hurt
only if the information that is disclosed influences consumers in
their choice of product or persuades other important third partiesfinancial institutions, contributors, public oversight bodies,
corporate customers or suppliers-to take some action to the
detriment of the employer. If it is clear enough why the employer
has an interest in discouraging disclosure of that sort of information, it is far less clear why the rest of the society should accommodate this interest by permitting the discharge of employees who
make such disclosures. 30 2 Rather, the harmful effects feared by
300 See Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, Local 114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966)
(adopting "actual malice" test of New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), as
test for what speech is unprotected by § 7 and thus actionable under state defamation
law). Concededly, some misleading opinions and some unprovable false statements
may end up being protected; as in libel actions it is likely that the employer will bear
the burden of proof of "actual malice" and falsity to strip employees of § 7
protection. But by and large damaging falsehoods will not be protected.
30) Concededly, other kinds of disclosures or internal dissent may have disruptive
effects within the organization-undermining managerial authority or sowing
employee discontent-but I can see no reason why those effects would be any greater
than the effects of dissent concerning terms and conditions of employment, which is
already protected. On the contrary, the Act contemplates and sanctions very dramatic
disruptions, such as strikes, as a potential consequence of the exercise of § 7 rights.
See supra text accompanying notes 110-121.
302 There are many ways in which costs to the firm could impose society-wide
costs. For example, firms might respond to the proposed expansion of employee
rights by attempting to limit the dissemination of potentially damaging information
within the firm; this would presumably entail the inefficient use of resources to keep
information secret and a loss of productivity that would otherwise follow from
employee access to such information. Such a response might also appear likely to
deter management from expanding employee involvement in decisionmaking in
matters such as product quality: to the extent that employee participation requires
wider dissemination of information, it would entail a greater risk of damaging public
disclosures by employees.
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the employer would seem simply to be the consequence of better
informed decisions in both the private and public sectors.
Much the same analysis holds with respect to the differing
missions of private and public employers and the different bodies
to which they are responsible. It is true that, for public employers,
there is no cognizable conflict between. the interest of the public in
receiving information and the interests of management, since
management is responsible ultimately to that same public. Private
management, on the other hand, responds to private ownership,
whose interest in maximizing profits may well conflict with the
interests of the public in disclosure of potentially damaging
information. But does this difference justify the failure to protect
employee disclosures on matters of interest to the public?
Given the competitive context within which firms operate, the
owners or shareholders of firms subjected to damaging disclosures
may well suffer as a result. But other firms will probably benefit
from increased business to roughly the same extent. It is hard to
see what public interest is served by favoring the former over the
latter. Again assuming that the information is generally true and of
enough concern to consumers or other economic actors to influence
their decisions in the market, the public interests served by
protecting disclosure seem at least as strong as the private interests
of one set of owners in the competitive advantage that they might
gain by prohibiting disclosure.
We are compelled to choose among plausible interpretations of
the scope of employee rights to criticize their employers and to
disclose information that might lead consumers and others to
disfavor the employer. The existing narrower interpretation of
those employee rights, which limits employees to discussing matters
directly relevant to the terms and conditions of their employment,
It is beyond the scope of this Article to evaluate the economic costs entailed by
the proposal. Nevertheless, I do not believe these costs would prove a major
problem. The extent and likelihood of damaging public disclosures by employees
would not be materially incerased by the proposal given, first, the formiddable
deterrents faced by employees contemplating disclosure, seesupratext accompanying
notes 214-33, and second, the existing risk of disclosures protected under current law.
The costs entailed by such disclosures might be ameliorated or perhaps even
outweighed by the benefits to the firm of internal dissemination of information.
THose benefits might include, in the case of a firm expanding employee involvement
, increased employee satisfaction with work and commitment to the enterprise. See
supra text accompanying note 139. Indeed, increased employee satisfaction itself
might even decrease the likelihood of public disclosures by employees. (I thank my
colleague Henry Hu for helping to clarify these matters.)
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is supported by employers' private interest in maximizing profits by
preventing and punishing disclosure of information that might
affect marketplace decisions. The broader interpretation advocated
here is supported not only by the interests of employees in being
free to discuss and act upon the full range of issues of concern to
them in their work lives, but also by the interest of the public in
gaining significant information about the activities of private
enterprises that might otherwise not become known.
CONCLUSION

The employer interests that seem to push against a broader
conception of the interests of employees under section 7 turn out
upon scrutiny not to be grounded in or even easily reconcilable with
the Act. Moreover, the interests of private management in
discouraging employee protests of this nature are not particularly
compelling candidates for public recognition: to a great extent,
employers will be harmed only to the extent that the public has
gained information about them that it deems useful. The public
interest in that information has, I submit, as good a claim for
consideration under the statute as the interests of employers-already deeply and deliberately compromised by the Act-in employee
loyalty and managerial prerogative.
But the key to expanding the scope of section 7 to include
employee protest directed at the product or service or nonlabor
practices of the employer is a richer understanding of the interests
of employees in these matters. The seamless continuity between
economic self-interest in workplace disputes and the loftiest
concerns of the polity was perhaps better apprehended several
decades ago, when issues such as labor unrest and the distribution
of wealth were at the forefront of national political debate. These
currents are reflected most clearly in Thornhill v. Alabama,30 3 in
which the Court held that peaceful labor picketing was protected by
the First Amendment.-0 4 In striking down a state antipicketing
statute, the Supreme Court declared:
In the circumstances of our times the dissemination of information
concerning the facts of a labor dispute must be regarded as within
the area of free discussion that is guaranteed by the Constitu303 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
'04 See id. at 105-06. The decision was based on the ground of facial overbreadth.
See id. at 96-98.
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tion.... The health of the present generation and of those as yet
unborn may depend on these matters, and the practices in a single
factory may have economic repercussions upon a whole region and
affect widespread systems of marketing.... [L]abor relations are
not matters of mere local or private concern. Free discussion
concerning the conditions in industry and the causes of labor
disputes appears to us indispensable to the effective and intelligent
use of the processes of popular government to shape the destiny
3 05
of modern industrial society.
The constitutional status of labor speech, and especially labor
picketing, has declined dramatically since 1940.06 Restrictions
on labor picketing that would not survive the strict scrutiny
ordinarily demanded by the First Amendment have been approved
under the sort of deferential balancing analysis used for mere
economic legislation.3 0 7 The relegation of labor expression to the
realm of private economic activity has largely removed constitutional hurdles to the enforcement of statutory restrictions on most
"secondary" appeals, by which labor might more effectively seek the
support of fellow workers, consumers, and the public generally."0 8

Connick suggests an explanation for the decline: workplace issues
generally have come to be viewed as matters of merely private
significance, with little relevance to "matters of public con30 9

cern."

Id. at 102-03.
306 SeeJames G. Pope, Laborand the Constitution: FromAbolition to Deindustrialization, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1071, 1094-96, 1113-18 (1987); Cynthia Estlund, Note, Labor
Picketingand CommercialSpeech: FreeEnterpriseValues in the Doctrine ofFreeSpeech, 91
YALE L.J. 938, 940-41 (1982) [hereinafter Note, LaborPicketing];Mark D. Schneider,
Note, PeacefulLaborPicketing and the FirstAmendment, 82 CoLUM. L. REv.1469, 147595 (1982).
307 See Pope, supra note 56, at 914-19; Note, LaborPicketing,supra note 306, at 94347. 08
3 See NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607, 616
(1980) (dismissing in one paragraph a First Amendment challenge to the secondary
boycott provisions of the NLRA). Those restrictions would be manifestly unconstitutional if applied to speech on "public issues," such as a consumer boycott instituted
as a civil rights protest. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
309 Connick, 461 U.S. at 152; see also Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 913
(distinguishing labor picketing from civil rights picketing in support of a consumer
boycott by characterizing the former as economic activity and the latter as "public
issues"); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980) (rejecting on equal protection
grounds an antipicketing ordinance that exempted peaceful labor picketing). See
generally Pope, supra note 56, at 921-22 (discussing the Court's use of the politicaleconomic distinction). The development of this distinction is ironic, in that the very
first subject denominated a"matter of public concern" by the Supreme Court was the
labor dispute at issue in Thornhill. Contrary signals appear in the Court's more
305
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The same uncoupling of "labor relations" from public affairs-an
about-face from the powerful pronouncements of Thornhill-seems
to be at work as well behind the constraints on section 7 doctrine
manifested in Eastex andJefferson Standard: politics, product quality,

public safety and environmental concerns are not within the
separate and lesser realm of "labor relations" covered by section 7.
Just as the public is not thought to be especially concerned about
what goes on within the private-sector workplace between labor and
management, workers are not thought to have a substantial and
legitimate interest in how the work they do affects their communities.
Thornhill cloaks ordinary labor disputes in the shimmering fabric
of self-government. Perhaps the rhetoric of Thornhill, rather than
the retreat that followed, was an aberration in American jurisprudence. But it captured a truth that is missing in both the First
Amendment treatment of public employee speech and the section
7 protection of private employee protest: personal experiences and
interests in the workplace transform, and in turn are transformed
by, concerns about the community and the society at large. This
Article aims to recapture that insight in the context of section 7:
Employees who join together and express their shared concerns
about how their work and their enterprise affect the world are
indeed engaged in "concerted activity for mutual aid or protection."

recent decision in Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building &
Construction Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575-78 (1988), in which the Court
construed § 8(b)(4) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1988), not to proscribe
union handbillingin support of a secondary consumer boycott. The Court did so to
avoid what it termed "serious constitutional issues" raised by a contrary construction
of the Act. EdwardJ.DeBartolo,Corp., 485 U.S. at 576. According to the Court, these
constitutional issues arose in part because the challenged leaflets, beyond soliciting
support in the particular labor dispute, "pressed the benefits of unionism to the
community and the dangers of inadequate wages to the economy and the standard
of living of the populace." Id.

